Another problem with blackmail is that if it is based on information (as opposed to say a physical piece of forensic evidence), you can't really buy it. So what you have is a repeat game, and at each step the payoff matrix looks exactly the same. What is very interesting is that typically, if the victim refuses to pay, the blackmailer either has the same payoff from revealing or hiding the secret, or even a cost associated with revealing (black mail being illegal, involvement in the secret, social repercussions from being a tell, having kept it secret for long, etc.). The two types you don't want to deal with are professional black mailers (who'll have a positive payoff from a reputation of revealing when he deals with future victims) or emotional black mailers (who would gain pleasure from revealing your secret). If you want to black mail, you should try to demonstrate you are this kind of black mailer, true or not. The other thing to consider is that if you pay, the black mailers pay off matrix still looks the same afterwards, so you'll have to pay again. This is actually what the victim wants - the black mailer's expectation of future payments is what keeps him from revealing your secret. As a victim, just be sure to only pay in a way that the net present value of your future payments doesn't exceed the value of the secret. The math becomes interesting for secrets whose value change over time, where you'll as always have to look forward and reason backwards. The simplest case is a secret of constant worth until it expires at a certain date. Say you have a secret that becomes irrelevant in 10 years (say its a crime with a statute of limitations). Just before the secret expires, you'll be willing to pay the full worth, say 1,000 credits. A year before that, your blackmailer will approach you and ask for payment. You know you'll pay 1,000 credits in a year if your secret isn't revealed, and with say a 10% discount rate, that makes it worth ~900 credits now. At this point in time, your secret is also worth 1,000 credits to you, so you can be blackmailed for maxium 100 credits that year. And so on for previous years - what it works out to is that maximum amount you can be blackmailed is exactly like a loan with out amortization. Of course, when negotiating the black mail price, you need to consider the blackmailer's payoffs - no one says you should accept the worst possible situation for you. If black mailing is legal and you can set up binding agreements (or if there are illegal elements willing to enforce such an agreement), things become much simpler, as you can simply change the payoff matrices with contracts to avoid the repeat game complications. Provoking idea: Black mailing is a cost on secrecy. Black mailing being illegal and immoral is a cost on black mailing, meaning it is less profitable and so fewer will engage in it and victims will be squeezed for less. Thus opposition to black mailing makes secrecy CHEAPER, which in turn makes activities that depend on secrecy more profitable, like crime and socially unacceptable activities (and for activities that are socially unacceptable due to bias, legal black mailing would mean it would be comparatively more attractive to step out into the open and combat the bias - so laws against black mailing help perpetuate prejudice). Imagine that the cost of commiting crimes with a partner, cheating on your spouse and being a closet atheist or homosexual (including in the US) went dramatically up - would that be a good thing?