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Survival of the Soul

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Fri, 2013-03-15 02:44
#1
jhfurnish jhfurnish's picture
Survival of the Soul
In the game I'm about to start this Sunday, the topic of the survival of the human soul (in regards to the nature of forks and backups) has come up. I'm reprinting a paragraph here from a response email to the player in question, in order to generate a discussion I think will be quite interesting, unless I'm creating a duplicate thread. In any case, consider: RE: The discussion on the quandary of 'living human vs digital copy' - consider the Star Trek transporter quandary. James Blish discussed this at length via dialogue amongst the standard TOS characters in his first - one of the earliest printed - Trek novels, 'Spock Must Die'. Does the matter transporter simply kill and make a new copy every time someone transports? Of course, science has debunked this particular means of transportation as being impossible, from what I've read, but it's interesting reading, and the book is a short and fast read. Publisher is Bantam, 1969 or 1970 I think. "By definition, yon soul is immortal, an' canna die." - Montgomery Scott, Chief Engineer, USS Enterprise
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Fri, 2013-03-15 10:12
Decimator Decimator's picture
In the actual setting, the
In the actual setting, the people who thought that resleeving somehow damages their soul all died in the Fall(with exceptions like the Jovians). Like in real life, attempting to empirically determine the existence of the soul is an exercise in not just futility, but foolishness as well. So, I say leave the question open. It has no determinable answer.
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Fri, 2013-03-15 11:02
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
jhfurnish wrote:Does the
jhfurnish wrote:
Does the matter transporter simply kill and make a new copy every time someone transports?
Probably. But the original doesn't care, the copy doesn't care, the people who know the person don't care, and the vast, impersonal universe [i]certainly[/i] doesn't care. If you're not willing to accept the survival of an atomically perfect copy of you as being your own survival, please enjoy the inconvenience of manually flying the atoms you're apparently so attached to everywhere.
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[------------/Nation States/-----------] [-----/Representative Democracy/-----] [--------/Regulated Capitalism/--------]
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Fri, 2013-03-15 11:09
Yerameyahu Yerameyahu's picture
I agree: in the world of EP,
I agree: in the world of EP, a character pursuing this question is one with a strange worldview. That doesn't mean it can't happen, but it means this is a person who is 'weird'. Much of the people they'd interact with would find the question nonsensical, ridiculous, or trivial.
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Fri, 2013-03-15 14:24
NewtonPulsifer NewtonPulsifer's picture
This has been settled for
This has been settled for like ever! :) You've all heard of the four humors, right? The soul originates in the heart, and spreads to the brain, liver, and gonads. As Avicenna relates: "From mixture of the four humors in different weights, God the most high created different organs; one with more blood like muscle, one with more black bile like bone, one with more phlegm like brain, and one with more yellow bile like lung." "God the most high created the souls from the softness of humors; each soul has it own weight and amalgamation. The generation and nourishment of proper soul takes place in the heart; it resides in the heart and arteries, and is transmitted from the heart to the organs through the arteries. At first, it proper soul enters the master organs such as the brain, liver or reproductive organs; from there it goes to other organs while the nature of the soul is being modified in each of them. As long as the soulis in the heart, it is quite warm, with the nature of fire, and the softness of bile is dominant. Then, that part which goes to the brain to keep it vital and functioning, becomes colder and wetter, and in its composition the serous softness and phlegm vapor dominate. That part, which enters the liver to keep its vitality and functions, becomes softer, warmer and sensibly wet, and in its composition the softness of air and vapor of blood dominate." "In general, there are four types of proper spirit: One is brutal spirit residing in the heart and it is the origin of all spirits. Another – as physicians refer to it – is sensual spirit residing in the brain. The third – as physicians refer to it – is natural spirit residing in the liver. The fourth is generative – i.e. procreative – spirits residing in the gonads. These four spirits go-between the soul of absolute purity and the body of absolute impurity."
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"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."- Isoroku Yamamoto
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Fri, 2013-03-15 14:48
Undocking Undocking's picture
Exploring this idea in EP may
Exploring this idea in EP may be a little too late for the rest of the setting. Unless the character is Jovian opting for being sleeved (or an AGI having some sort of existential crises). But in the rules, resleeving, forking, and all sorts of continuity shifts have a negative effect on the character's psyche. This could support the idea that the character loses something or misplaces something every time. Also, asyncs must have something weird about them, considering their powers don't work (and they don't enjoy being) in synths. The survival of the soul is still important, but what a 'soul' is or means in Eclipse Phase would be something interesting to explore.
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Fri, 2013-03-15 15:20
Axel the Chimeric Axel the Chimeric's picture
As has been pointed out, it's
As has been pointed out, it's a question with no answer and anyone who probably cares too greatly about it probably didn't survive the Fall. Most people probably consider that, as long as it's their memories, personality, etc., then it's them. Anyone who feared this problem prior to the Fall and who was reinstanced from a back-up might make some mental jumps that, as long as it's the same as their current mind, their consciousness prevails and, as such, provide their own answer to the problem (and probably include in their insurance policy a demand that they be reinstanced from cortical stack whenever possible). Really, though, it's a question I'm sure many ask. I don't think many people would consider it too weird to have such thoughts. It's the people who obsess over it and take it to extremes (such as refusing to have any back-up beyond their stack) that are the weird ones.
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Fri, 2013-03-15 19:37
Smokeskin Smokeskin's picture
In 2013, a suicide bomber
In 2013, a suicide bomber walks up his sworn enemy and blows himself up, confident he'll live on in heaven. In 2113, Smokeskin has his ego scanned, copied and sleeved in another morhp and still refuses to kill himself, not at all confident that the existence of copy will make it feel any less than dying. Arenamontanus shakes his head at Smokeskin and shows him all the science that was apparent even a century ago, how the flux of matter and energy in the brain makes it a fluent thing, how there's nothing material to support the continuation of consciousness. "Smokeskin, believing that your consciousness continues from moment to moment is no different from the suicide bomber's idea that he'll go to heaven. It's nothing but a pseudophilosophical rationalization of your primitive survival instinct. It makes no sense to define yourself as anything narrower than the equivalent class of all sufficiently Smokeskin-like processes." Arena happily egocasts around, regularly snuffing out Arena-like processes. Smokeskin still doesn't want to kill himself. Maybe he's irrational, but so is having sex without the intent to reproduce. If we don't let our feelings and instincts guide us, don't we stop being human, he asks himself, and then quickly changes the subject before he thinks too hard about how he never puts even really annoying people in choke holds. ---------------------- It's all a matter of perspective. Claiming that there's a soul, or that our survival instinct is hooked up to something real, or that you live on in your name and legacy or through your children, or that nothing matters and you might as well kill yourself now, it's just some arbitrary stance. I have a feeling that in a world of common uploading, my opposition to the idea would eventually fade. I'd probably do it eventually and be scared shitless the first time, then wake up in my new morph and realize it wasn't that big a deal, and join the rest of transhumanity.
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Sat, 2013-03-16 03:10
Capitalocracy Capitalocracy's picture
So the character in question
So the character in question is the one I'm making. I would say he wouldn't voice his concern as the "soul", but more like the "self" or one's "life", which are equally debatable terms. He's going to be an old man, someone who was born before backups and resleeving and farcasting became the norm. He's not going to be sort of clinging desperately to what he considers his "life" because of this, as he will have been resleeved before, but he'll be uncomfortable with it and avoid it if possible... he didn't grow up a transhuman and it's hard for him to wrap his head around it. Plus he's old enough he doesn't mind catching a ride on a Scum swarm to get around... the journey's more important than the destination, and since one is nearly immortal anyway, what's the rush? Of course, once he starts working for Firewall, he's going to have to up the pace a bit I imagine. He'll also be a drooler and terrible at AR games.
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Sun, 2013-03-17 20:58
Axel the Chimeric Axel the Chimeric's picture
Smokeskin wrote:I'd probably
Smokeskin wrote:
I'd probably do it eventually and be scared shitless the first time, then wake up in my new morph and realize it wasn't that big a deal, and join the rest of transhumanity.
A notable point is that 99.9% of transhumanity has already done this, what with the Fall.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 09:26
VV VV's picture
Smokeskin wrote:I have a
Smokeskin wrote:
I have a feeling that in a world of common uploading, my opposition to the idea would eventually fade. I'd probably do it eventually and be scared shitless the first time, then wake up in my new morph and realize it wasn't that big a deal, and join the rest of transhumanity.
But you wouldn't wake up. The farcaster's last experience in life would be sitting down in the brain booth. A copy of you wakes up at the other end with all your memories, but you personally wouldn't experience that since your consciousness was killed when your ego was deleted.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 09:56
CodeBreaker CodeBreaker's picture
VV wrote:Smokeskin wrote:I
VV wrote:
Smokeskin wrote:
I have a feeling that in a world of common uploading, my opposition to the idea would eventually fade. I'd probably do it eventually and be scared shitless the first time, then wake up in my new morph and realize it wasn't that big a deal, and join the rest of transhumanity.
But you wouldn't wake up. The farcaster's last experience in life would be sitting down in the brain booth. A copy of you wakes up at the other end with all your memories, but you personally wouldn't experience that since your consciousness was killed when your ego was deleted.
But a copy of me who, for all intents and purposes is me, did survive. My current consciousness would not have experienced it, but the information that makes up that consciousness has. And that experience seems to have resulted in an exact duplicate of my current consciousness being flung across the far reaches of solar space. The trouble with this line of argument is that it requires a particular line of reasoning to feel 'safe'. And it isn't exactly something I can convince you of with just words, for a number of reasons.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 10:01
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:Smokeskin wrote:I
VV wrote:
Smokeskin wrote:
I have a feeling that in a world of common uploading, my opposition to the idea would eventually fade. I'd probably do it eventually and be scared shitless the first time, then wake up in my new morph and realize it wasn't that big a deal, and join the rest of transhumanity.
But you wouldn't wake up. The farcaster's last experience in life would be sitting down in the brain booth. A copy of you wakes up at the other end with all your memories, but you personally wouldn't experience that since your consciousness was killed when your ego was deleted.
Again: what's the difference? If consciousness exists, then it's something generated by the mind. As soon as the copy of the farcaster's mind begins running again, it will generate a new consciousness. The one we have is basically lost second to second anyway, constantly recreated anew. What does it matter if the next time it's recreated it happens on another planet?
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[------------/Nation States/-----------] [-----/Representative Democracy/-----] [--------/Regulated Capitalism/--------]
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Tue, 2013-03-19 11:19
VV VV's picture
I have a hard time believing
I have a hard time believing I'd perceive anything that happened in the copy. When you make an alpha fork you're not able to experience what it's doing if it goes away. I understand what you're saying about consciousness being regenerated, Ilmarinen, but there's a state you can induce in me (death) that makes that process stop. I think that's exactly what I'd experience during ego deletion; I don't think I would experience anything that the copy experienced on the other planet.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 11:39
CodeBreaker CodeBreaker's picture
VV wrote:I have a hard time
VV wrote:
I have a hard time believing I'd perceive anything that happened in the copy. When you make an alpha fork you're not able to experience what it's doing if it goes away.
Very few people will argue that you do. The difference might stem from how I define 'me' and how you might define 'you'. Yes, when you farcast your current consciousness effectively suffers death. That thread of 'me' ends, kapoot, no more. While you might argue that all examples of 'me' go with it, and only a copy remains, I would argue that that is semantics in the greater scheme of things. Take, as an example, when I go to sleep tonight. The current 'me' might end. My current stream of consciousness ends. The 'me' that wakes up tomorrow might not be the 'me' typing out this paragraph. The only difference involved when I am farcasting is that the 'me' that wakes up half way across the system is now running on new hardware. From an internal point of view there is no difference. So no, the current 'me' wouldn't experience anything the copy experienced on that other planet, at least without being merged and folded back into the current 'me'. But a copy of 'me' would. And that copy thinks, acts and reacts exactly as I do. What's the difference? Many transhumanists will say that the differences that do arise are effectively ignorable.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 11:52
VV VV's picture
CodeBreaker wrote:
CodeBreaker wrote:
What's the difference? Many transhumanists will say that the differences that do arise are effectively ignorable.
Well...the difference is that you're dead! Sure, the universe continues without you in it. (Your absence is even less noticeable than usual, because there's a perfect copy of you running around on a space station somewhere, replying to emails.) But you're dead! It's not at all like you going to sleep tonight, since (hopefully) you will wake up in the morning and continue your experience. It's like you going to sleep tonight and while it happens someone sneaks in and shoots you in the head. The perfect copy that replaces you might not know the difference. HIS internal experience is no different. But yours is as different as it could possibly be, you died!
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Tue, 2013-03-19 11:57
CodeBreaker CodeBreaker's picture
VV wrote:
VV wrote:
It's not at all like you going to sleep tonight, since (hopefully) you will wake up in the morning and continue your experience. It's like you going to sleep tonight and while it happens someone sneaks in and shoots you in the head.
I won't wake up tomorrow. Or at least I have no proof that I will. The continuation of my consciousness has been broken. Yes, it is like me going to sleep tonight and someone puts a bullet through my head. The funny thing is I have no proof that that isn't already happening every night. And with that in mind, what does it matter if this stream of consciousness ends on a farcast table and next time I wake up I am somewhere else?
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Tue, 2013-03-19 12:04
VV VV's picture
CodeBreaker wrote:
CodeBreaker wrote:
And with that in mind, what does it matter if this stream of consciousness ends on a farcast table and next time I wake up I am somewhere else?
But it won't. There's no conceivable way your consciousness can make the journey. This is demonstrated by your consciousness not perceiving anything an alpha fork perceives. You and I may or may not be being killed and replaced with identical copies tonight, but that's definitely happening to you if you farcast.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 12:10
CodeBreaker CodeBreaker's picture
VV wrote:CodeBreaker wrote:
VV wrote:
CodeBreaker wrote:
And with that in mind, what does it matter if this stream of consciousness ends on a farcast table and next time I wake up I am somewhere else?
But it won't. There's no conceivable way your consciousness can make the journey. This is demonstrated by your consciousness not perceiving anything an alpha fork perceives.
Correct. Why does that matter? I have no attachment to my current stream of consciousness, other than it being a vehicle for the pattern that other people associate as 'me' to act through. I already lack proof that my consciousness makes the journey from waking to sleeping to waking. I don't value my current stream of consciousness because it is already ethereal. If I did then I would find going to sleep utterly terrifying. The pattern that makes up me survives the farcast. If I place worth in that pattern rather than its current physical iteration then the part of me that I value doesn't die when I farcast. Rather it becomes immortal.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 12:22
VV VV's picture
CodeBreaker wrote:
CodeBreaker wrote:
Correct. Why does that matter? I have no attachment to my current stream of consciousness, other than it being a vehicle for the pattern that other people associate as 'me' to act through. I already lack proof that my consciousness makes the journey from waking to sleeping to waking.
Philosophically speaking that's correct, but we do have an experience of continuity of consciousness. There is an entity called "You" that experiences both going to sleep on Tuesday and waking up on Wednesday. However, if you create a copy of yourself, You don't perceive it waking up the next morning. This is what it would feel like to farcast - you would never wake up on the distant farcast table. You die and experience no more. It's not like going to sleep at all.
CodeBreaker wrote:
The pattern that makes up me survives the farcast. If I place worth in that pattern rather than its current physical iteration then the part of me that I value doesn't die when I farcast. Rather it becomes immortal.
Yes, an eternal copy of you exists in a universe you are no longer a part of. I get that it's a comfort, especially to others, but if it's not an immortality you can experience what's the good of it?
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Tue, 2013-03-19 12:24
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:I have a hard time
VV wrote:
I have a hard time believing I'd perceive anything that happened in the copy. When you make an alpha fork you're not able to experience what it's doing if it goes away.
You do understand that the alpha fork [i]is[/i] you, right? From the moment a fork is made there are two people who have the experience of being you. They have (for a while) identical thoughts, identical memories, identical attitudes, identical everything. If there is such a thing as a consciousness, they both have an identical copy. If something happens to one of them, a 'you' survives - whether it's the you that is the original or the you that is a copy. If I copy a word file then I have two copies of a word file. For the moment I have two identical word files. Then I can change some of the words in each one so that they become subtly different. That's the thing you're talking about, I think. Then if I delete the original file, only the copy remains. But if I then move the copy back to where the original file was, the result will be identical to what it would have been if I'd just left the original file in place and did whatever was done to the copy directly to it. And that's all a backup or a farcast is. Your ego is a file. 'You' are a single instance of that file running. But [i]all[/i] instances of that file have the sense of being 'you'. If one instance ceases and another starts off exactly where the old one left off, what's the difference? Basically this is only a big deal if you consider [i]continuity[/i] of consciousness to be an important concept, in which case enjoy chartering spaceships any time you need to get someplace and permanently dying the first time something goes wrong.
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[------------/Nation States/-----------] [-----/Representative Democracy/-----] [--------/Regulated Capitalism/--------]
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Tue, 2013-03-19 12:30
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:You do
Ilmarinen wrote:
You do understand that the alpha fork [i]is[/i] you, right?
No, it's just a copy of me. I don't experience anything it experiences. If I die I don't get to live on through the eyes of my copy.
Ilmarinen wrote:
Basically this is only a big deal if you consider [i]continuity[/i] of consciousness to be an important concept, in which case enjoy chartering spaceships any time you need to get someplace and permanently dying the first time something goes wrong.
Yes, I believe that my continuity of consciousness = my life. If you kill me I stop experiencing things, however many perfect copies of me that are out there.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 12:45
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:Ilmarinen wrote:You
VV wrote:
Ilmarinen wrote:
You do understand that the alpha fork [i]is[/i] you, right?
No, it's just a copy of me. I don't experience anything it experiences. If I die I don't get to live on through the eyes of my copy.
Okay, let's say you make a fork of yourself. In fact let's make it a Start-Trek style copy, identical down to the last atom. The process involves going to sleep on a bed and then waking up in a different room next to your copy. Would you be able to tell if you're the copy or the original? The answer is no. The original you would have the experience of being the original you before the copying process. The copy you would [i]also[/i] have the experience of being the original you before the copying process. Neither of you would have the experience of being the other, but [i]both[/i] of you would have the experience of being the you before the process. Neither of you would perceive any break in consciousness save for going to sleep. The you who is the copy and the you who is the original would both feel like they're the original. Now let's say one of you gets shot afterward. Clearly the other you isn't dead. But is the you from before the copying took place dead? Does it matter if the you who got shot was you the original or you the copy? I would assert not. The you from before the copying would have died anyway when his past became your present, just as the you that you are right now will die before you finish reading this sentence to make space for the you who's read it. The only memorial to the you of a moment ago are the memories you have of being him.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 12:53
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:Now let's say
Ilmarinen wrote:
Now let's say one of you gets shot afterward. Clearly the other you isn't dead. But is the you from before the copying took place dead? Does it matter if the you who got shot was you the original or you the copy?
This is my point. It matters enormously to the one who was shot!
Ilmarinen wrote:
I would assert not. The you from before the copying would have died anyway when his past became your present, just as the you that you are right now will die before you finish reading this sentence to make space for the you who's read it. The only memorial to the you of a moment ago are the memories you have of being him.
Accepting that's true (and I have my doubts), then what I think of as "me" isn't so much a single consciousness but more a process of consciousnesses, each instantaneously replacing the last. Being killed still ends that process. It doesn't matter if there's a copy of me out there experiencing its own process – I can't experience it. Ego backup is written as though it were immortality but it really isn't.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 13:08
Lilith Lilith's picture
VV wrote:Ego backup is
VV wrote:
Ego backup is written as though it were immortality but it really isn't.
That's why it's referred to as [i]digital[/i] immortality. Also, for the record, pg. 269 of the core EP rulebook mentions that the process of resleeving (or even farcasting) is actually done [i]while the person is still conscious[/i], "with no gaps in awareness or memory, which helps reduce associated mental stress". So that's a thing to take into consideration as well.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 13:15
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:Ilmarinen wrote:
VV wrote:
Ilmarinen wrote:
I would assert not. The you from before the copying would have died anyway when his past became your present, just as the you that you are right now will die before you finish reading this sentence to make space for the you who's read it. The only memorial to the you of a moment ago are the memories you have of being him.
Accepting that's true (and I have my doubts), then what I think of as "me" isn't so much a single consciousness but more a process of consciousnesses, each instantaneously replacing the last. Being killed still ends that process. It doesn't matter if there's a copy of me out there experiencing its own process – I can't experience it. Ego backup is written as though it were immortality but it really isn't.
Right. Let's accept for a moment that 'consciousness' isn't something that's continuous but something that's being constantly destroyed and recreated at the speed of thought. If you let the concept bother you then the consciousness which started the horrible realization would not be the same consciousness that finished it. If we accept this as true then 'consciousness' is something that's generated when a computing machine such as a computer or a homo sapiens brain reads a file containing an ego. The contents of that file determine what consciousness is being generated. The consciousness that's being generated right now is solely the result of the file contents. Now let's say the process is interrupted. You're frozen in time. The file is preserved perfectly; the computer stands still. Have you died? When the computer starts again, will you be resurrected or will it be a copy of you that lives? Your answer to that is going to decide where this conversation goes.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 13:18
VV VV's picture
Lilith wrote:
Lilith wrote:
Also, for the record, pg. 269 of the core EP rulebook mentions that the process of resleeving (or even farcasting) is actually done [i]while the person is still conscious[/i], "with no gaps in awareness or memory, which helps reduce associated mental stress". So that's a thing to take into consideration as well.
I took that to mean that the copy is less stressed. To me the original is still killed when the ego is deleted.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 13:21
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:Now let's say
Ilmarinen wrote:
Now let's say the process is interrupted. You're frozen in time. The file is preserved perfectly; the computer stands still. Have you died? When the computer starts again, will you be resurrected or will it be a copy of you that lives? Your answer to that is going to decide where this conversation goes.
I think this process is driven by the brain. As long as the brain survives being frozen in time, if it's restarted after the process you describe then I think the original me would continue to exist.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 13:33
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:
VV wrote:
I think this process is driven by the brain. As long as the brain survives being frozen in time, if it's restarted after the process you describe then I think the original me would continue to exist.
Okay. Now let's say the file is transferred from one computer to another - and let's say it's actually moved rather than being copied. Have you died now?
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Tue, 2013-03-19 15:20
nezumi.hebereke nezumi.hebereke's picture
People are very good at
People are very good at rationalizing things. Dangerously so. If my dad went through the Fall, he being a very good Catholic, when faced with threat of imminent death, he very well might decide to upload himself (possibly a normal upload, 'destroying' the version on Earth, or possible just a fork). Either way, he wakes up on Luna, now safe. He's still Catholic; uploading doesn't remove that. He can say it was a sin, but it was justified, given the imminent threat, and go to confession. He can say it was a sin his former self on Earth committed, but he is sinless (not counting the whole not yet being baptised bit). He can say it was a sin that is unforgiveable, and live the rest of his life a bitter(er) old man. He could even believe this version of himself is not a real human, and consign himself to whatever that means (including, possibly, no limitations on egocasting). There are plenty of options for him as a rational Catholic to egocast, but still come away believing egocasting is a sin. This may be a shocker, but a lot of people who believe sex outside of marriage is sinful still have sex outside of marriage -- and continue to believe it's sinful. I believe people in EP will accept egocasting as having no moral ramifications the same way I accept employed Americans will accept capitalism as having no moral ramifications.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 15:46
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:Okay. Now let
Ilmarinen wrote:
Okay. Now let's say the file is transferred from one computer to another - and let's say it's actually moved rather than being copied. Have you died now?
But that's exactly my point. It's not actually moved anywhere, it's just that a copy is made of it somewhere else. You can make a million Alpha Forks of me and then shoot me through the head and I won't experience another second of life.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 16:58
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:Ilmarinen wrote:Okay
VV wrote:
Ilmarinen wrote:
Okay. Now let's say the file is transferred from one computer to another - and let's say it's actually moved rather than being copied. Have you died now?
But that's exactly my point. It's not actually moved anywhere, it's just that a copy is made of it somewhere else. You can make a million Alpha Forks of me and then shoot me through the head and I won't experience another second of life.
Okay, we may need to start this over. Let's go back to your first complaint: you don't experience the memories of your alpha fork. You're not currently experiencing whatever the future you from an hour ahead will experience either, but you still acknowledge him as being you. Is this correct? It would help me if you told me why you acknowledge the future you as being you. If your answer is the same as mine, I feel like I can make the case that from the perspective of current you both your original self an hour from now and an alpha fork of you made fifty minutes from now are equally 'you'. The original will think of itself as 'me.' The alpha work will think of itself as 'me.' But you, right now, can think of [i]both[/i] of them as 'me.'
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[------------/Nation States/-----------] [-----/Representative Democracy/-----] [--------/Regulated Capitalism/--------]
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Tue, 2013-03-19 16:58
NewtonPulsifer NewtonPulsifer's picture
VV wrote:Ilmarinen wrote:Okay
VV wrote:
Ilmarinen wrote:
Okay. Now let's say the file is transferred from one computer to another - and let's say it's actually moved rather than being copied. Have you died now?
But that's exactly my point. It's not actually moved anywhere, it's just that a copy is made of it somewhere else. You can make a million Alpha Forks of me and then shoot me through the head and I won't experience another second of life.
Ilmarinen is talking sneakernet here. Somebody takes your ego storage, removes it, and pops it into another computer and boots it. This is following the current paradigm of our computers (largely separated memory and processing). Keep in mind if you're using a neuromorphic computer you can't really separate processing from memory, and when you turn off a neuromorphic computer, there's no "Random Acess Memory" that gets cleared. It just freezes its state as is.
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"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."- Isoroku Yamamoto
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Tue, 2013-03-19 20:15
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:
Ilmarinen wrote:
Okay, we may need to start this over. Let's go back to your first complaint: you don't experience the memories of your alpha fork. You're not currently experiencing whatever the future you from an hour ahead will experience either, but you still acknowledge him as being you. Is this correct?
I only have the vaguest understanding of transhumanism so it may be the case that I am confused over a really basic point here. (My understanding of transhumanism is similar to my understanding of Buddhism - "There is a guy called Buddha, and reincarnation is involved, and everybody should be nice to one another".) The point I'm trying to make is about continuity of experience. I could be persuaded that I'm wrong about this, but I believe that there is a "me" who has been looking out of these two eyes and thinking with this one brain for my history. I understand and have heard of the idea that no one single cell that makes me up is more than a decade old. So either "me" has transitioned gradually into new hardware (one cell at a time) or "me" is a process of instantaneous consciousnesses as was (somewhat startlingly) proposed earlier in the thread. Still, I contend that resleeving is nothing more than recording my memories and putting them into something else. Whether that something else is an Alpha Fork or a toaster, we agree that I will never experience what the copy experiences. I mean to say that if you make an Alpha Fork of me and then the copy goes into another room, I won't see what the Alpha Fork sees. "Me" is limited to the body I'm in, even though a perfect copy of me sits in another room. I am trying to say that I can only experience the things that happen to this morph, the one I was born in. You can copy my thoughts and memories perfectly and load them into a new body, but that won't affect my life in any way. Please tell me I'm wrong about this, but from my reading it's not the case that a consciousness moves between morphs. Person B is copied from Person A. And Person A is lobotomised.
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Tue, 2013-03-19 21:22
mkn mkn's picture
This is one of the more
This is one of the more interesting threads I've seen here... I wrote a pretty long contribution, but I won't pollute your eyes unnecessarily. I think one of the big conceptual breaks at play is that, from our current understanding of the universe, concepts like "copy" and "original" are just that--concepts, or approximate models of reality. They're a useful construct under certain circumstances, but they break down to the point of being meaningless when we're talking about medium-independent systems of information like computer files--or human minds emulated in software. People may still hold onto them, but they are essentially meaningless. All you have is two functionally identical instances of the same information that can be manipulated independently. It's a brain bender, but it's analogous to what's happened to the concept of a "soul". I suspect many EP players have come to terms with the idea that there is no such thing (if not, I don't mean to be condescending). But if you've ever had a real heart to heart with someone who has strong religious feelings re: the existence of a soul, you know how difficult it is for rational argument to alter a concept that is central to someone's world view. From a gameplay perspective--I think EP is (appropriately) vague about a lot of these issues. Even the best neuroscientists on earth can't tell us what part of us is "conscious" or where the thing I call "me" comes from. Personally, I think this will prove waaaay more difficult than the most optimistic transhumanists suspect--so much of "you" seems to be bound up in your body… it's difficult to believe that it is as simple as the hardware/software dichotomy. But this is the premise put forth in EP. So "You", "Me", and "I" are also flexible concepts. In EP, they are mostly intact, but posthumans and exhumans are quickly chipping away at them. I can't imagine getting my head around any of this, to the point where I'd be ok with egocasting (even though I know intellectually that it's an irrational fear). Maybe if I'd been egocasting since childhood, I'd consider this merely an interesting quandary, like a first year philosophy student pondering the thought experiment of "Theseus's Ship".
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“Man is an artifact designed for space travel. He is not designed to remain in his present biologic state any more than a tadpole is designed to remain a tadpole.” -William S. Burroughs
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Tue, 2013-03-19 21:32
NewtonPulsifer NewtonPulsifer's picture
We're leaving out merging of
We're leaving out merging of egos, which is also possible in EP. Not recommend for divergences of greater than a week or so. Subjectively seamless transfer of ego is possible (per pg. 269) - but yes, if Chuck for example evacuates a copy of his cyberbrain to an ecto, you have two Chucks - Chuck@cyberbrain and Chuck@ecto. You can program it as a copy to ecto/boot ecto/wipe cyberbrain or else do it one virtual neuron at a time (bridging across the cyberbrain and ecto for a fraction of a second). The first way kills Chuck@cyberbrain, the second way transitions Chuck@cyberbrain to Chuck@cyberbrain&ecto to Chuck@ecto.
—
"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."- Isoroku Yamamoto
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Tue, 2013-03-19 22:03
VV VV's picture
mkn wrote:It's a brain bender
mkn wrote:
It's a brain bender, but it's analogous to what's happened to the concept of a "soul". I suspect many EP players have come to terms with the idea that there is no such thing (if not, I don't mean to be condescending). But if you've ever had a real heart to heart with someone who has strong religious feelings re: the existence of a soul, you know how difficult it is for rational argument to alter a concept that is central to someone's world view.
But to me it's the other way round. The transhuman point of view seems to be arguing for a "soul". Let me shoot you in the head, they say. You will wake up in a better place.
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Wed, 2013-03-20 00:33
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:
VV wrote:
The point I'm trying to make is about continuity of experience. I could be persuaded that I'm wrong about this, but I believe that there is a "me" who has been looking out of these two eyes and thinking with this one brain for my history.
Okay, so here's how it works in Eclipse Phase: there is a file of 0s and 1s. This file is called your ego. It can be run on your biological brain. It can be run on a cyberbrain. It can be run on a server, copied, moved, altered and pruned. The continuity of consciousness you describe isn't some quasi-mystical thing. It's just a set of changes to your ego. You smell a flower and your ego is updated. You think about what you're going to have for lunch and your ego is updated. You learn a new skill and your ego is updated. The updates to our ego are the stream of consciousness; they're what makes you different from the you who created you as an alpha fork. Long story short: The me of right now survives as long as there is some future version of me that remembers being the me of right now. If an hour from now I create an alpha fork of myself, the original and the alpha fork won't remember being each other but they will both remember being me. By that measure 'I' am alive as long as at least one of them survives.
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[------------/Nation States/-----------] [-----/Representative Democracy/-----] [--------/Regulated Capitalism/--------]
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Wed, 2013-03-20 02:30
mkn mkn's picture
At the risk of paradox, I
At the risk of paradox, I actually agree with that to a point--the "ego", as interpreted in the EP rulebook, is awfully close to a metaphysical soul or essence. Except for the fact that it can be edited and hacked. I think the alienation check you make when sleeving into a new morph is a reasonably good abstraction of the feeling of being "sort of" the same person, but also of being someone else. Cultural acclimatization probably determines whether that feeling is a mild annoyance, or an existential nightmare. I imagine a lot of people just don't care (even if that's a profoundly alien attitude to us today). Their education and environment tells them that squirting your conciousness out on a neutrino beam is no better or worse than taking a walk down to the corner store. Another analogy--it was once a terrifying idea for many people that the earth was not at the center of God's universe. We now take it for granted that we're one mote of dust in one galaxy among billions. We might only be ok with it because we can't actually conceptualize the hugeness of the universe, and how tiny we are in relation to it. "Rapture of the Nerds" is out in a creative commons release--the main character goes through a lot of these same quandaries. It's a pretty lighthearted treatment of the subject, but it might be worth a read.
—
“Man is an artifact designed for space travel. He is not designed to remain in his present biologic state any more than a tadpole is designed to remain a tadpole.” -William S. Burroughs
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Wed, 2013-03-20 08:31
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:Okay, so here
Ilmarinen wrote:
Okay, so here's how it works in Eclipse Phase: there is a file of 0s and 1s. This file is called your ego. It can be run on your biological brain. It can be run on a cyberbrain. It can be run on a server, copied, moved, altered and pruned.
My understanding (which could well be wrong) is that data doesn't actually "move", and that's the point. When I send Ego.doc from my computer to yours, all the 1s and 0s that make up the file don't actually get up and leave my computer. Instead your computer creates a new file called Ego.doc and copies exactly all the 1s and 0s. That doesn't mean my Ego has moved. My Ego is still right there in my computer (or morph). There's no way for my Ego to get out of the morph because data doesn't move, it can only be copied. I would never perceive what's happening in the morph I sent a copy of myself to. If you kill me I still stop experiencing things, and it's totally irrelevant that there is a perfect copy out there somewhere.
Ilmarinen wrote:
Long story short: The me of right now survives as long as there is some future version of me that remembers being the me of right now. If an hour from now I create an alpha fork of myself, the original and the alpha fork won't remember being each other but they will both remember being me. By that measure 'I' am alive as long as at least one of them survives.
No, by that measure either you are alive or a perfect copy of you is alive. If I had the two of you in a room, which one I shoot in the head determines whether you live or die. Having a copy doesn't make you any more immortal than someone who has a twin.
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Wed, 2013-03-20 08:33
VV VV's picture
NewtonPulsifer wrote:The
NewtonPulsifer wrote:
The first way kills Chuck@cyberbrain, the second way transitions Chuck@cyberbrain to Chuck@cyberbrain&ecto to Chuck@ecto.
I think the second way just lobotomises Chuck@cyberbrain one neuron at a time.
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Wed, 2013-03-20 08:33
VV VV's picture
NewtonPulsifer wrote:The
(Double post)
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Wed, 2013-03-20 10:58
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:Ilmarinen wrote:
VV wrote:
Ilmarinen wrote:
Long story short: The me of right now survives as long as there is some future version of me that remembers being the me of right now. If an hour from now I create an alpha fork of myself, the original and the alpha fork won't remember being each other but they will both remember being me. By that measure 'I' am alive as long as at least one of them survives.
No, by that measure either you are alive or a perfect copy of you is alive. If I had the two of you in a room, which one I shoot in the head determines whether you live or die. Having a copy doesn't make you any more immortal than someone who has a twin.
To bring this back to the star trek teleporter: we acknowledged that you remain you [i]even though none of the atoms that make up your brain are the ones that were originally there[/i]. So here are some questions: Do you stop being you if every atom in your brain is replaced at once instead of one at a time? If yes then what makes one hydrogen or carbon atom more essential to being you than another? If no then why do you stop being you if the new atoms are assembled at a different location? Again, keep in mind: the atoms are going to be replaced [i]no matter what[/i]. It's just a question of rate.
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[------------/Nation States/-----------] [-----/Representative Democracy/-----] [--------/Regulated Capitalism/--------]
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Wed, 2013-03-20 11:47
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:Do you stop
Ilmarinen wrote:
Do you stop being you if every atom in your brain is replaced at once instead of one at a time?...If no then why do you stop being you if the new atoms are assembled at a different location?
Because that's not what's happening. The atoms aren't being replaced. A copy of them is being assembled somewhere else. You seem to think that my awareness will transition to the new location somehow. But that's proven to be wrong, because if we create an Alpha Fork and it goes into another room I won't see what it sees.
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Wed, 2013-03-20 12:13
lets adapt lets adapt's picture
This appears to be ultimately
This appears to be ultimately a discussion about maintaining a stream of consciousness (or, the closest thing to it) versus the physical self or the hardware that "you" runs on. So far the only way to maintain that stream of consciousness when moving from body to body or hardware to hardware appears to be the gradual transition you experience when resleeving to a new body via ego bridge, as noted earlier. While you can make a million copies of yourself, be restored from a backup, or farcasted to some moon somewhere, the original self's stream of consciousness is not maintained or continued in any of these situations -- at least not subjectively. You can argue that this is not important as your ego remains, as that is truly the essence of "you," but you could also argue the stream of consciousness is the only unique thing to immediately arise from every copy you make of yourself.
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Wed, 2013-03-20 12:30
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:Ilmarinen wrote:Do
VV wrote:
Ilmarinen wrote:
Do you stop being you if every atom in your brain is replaced at once instead of one at a time?...If no then why do you stop being you if the new atoms are assembled at a different location?
Because that's not what's happening. The atoms aren't being replaced. A copy of them is being assembled somewhere else. You seem to think that my awareness will transition to the new location somehow. But that's proven to be wrong, because if we create an Alpha Fork and it goes into another room I won't see what it sees.
Again: your 'awareness' is just a surface process being generated when the hardware (your brain) runs a file (your ego). Its one and only effect past the exact second you're in is to make a change to your ego. But just to be clear: We take a brain. This is you. We replace every atom one by one over a period of several years. This is still you. We replace every atom all at once. I can't tell whether you agree that this is still you. We take the exact same pattern of atoms and assemble them somewhere other than the starting location. I think you disagree that this is you. I just need to know where you draw the line. Edit: An additional point: If a person is unconscious for the duration of the alpha forking process then upon waking up neither the original nor the alpha fork will know who the original is unless they're told. This suggests that whatever part of consciousness is maintained must be maintained for both of them, otherwise the alpha fork should be cognizant of the interruption.
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[------------/Nation States/-----------] [-----/Representative Democracy/-----] [--------/Regulated Capitalism/--------]
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Wed, 2013-03-20 12:52
VV VV's picture
Let me try and explain this
Let me try and explain this another way. If you were to be lobotomised in the morning, presumably you wouldn't sleep well tonight. Do you believe that if you were to be lobotomised in the morning, but after that an exact copy of your mind would be made in a new body, that you would somehow "wake up" in this new body and start experiencing what it experiences?
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Wed, 2013-03-20 12:57
Ilmarinen Ilmarinen's picture
VV wrote:Let me try and
VV wrote:
Let me try and explain this another way. If you were to be lobotomised in the morning, presumably you wouldn't sleep well tonight. Do you believe that if you were to be lobotomised in the morning, but after that an exact copy of your mind would be made in a new body, that you would somehow "wake up" in this new body and start experiencing what it experiences?
Yes. The lobotomized me and the copy me wouldn't be [i]each other[/i], but they would both be [i]me[/i]. I would seriously like your answer on the brain thing, though, because it's kind of the philosophical cornerstone of this whole discussion.
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[------------/Nation States/-----------] [-----/Representative Democracy/-----] [--------/Regulated Capitalism/--------]
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Wed, 2013-03-20 12:59
NewtonPulsifer NewtonPulsifer's picture
VV wrote:NewtonPulsifer wrote
VV wrote:
NewtonPulsifer wrote:
The first way kills Chuck@cyberbrain, the second way transitions Chuck@cyberbrain to Chuck@cyberbrain&ecto to Chuck@ecto.
I think the second way just lobotomises Chuck@cyberbrain one neuron at a time.
The use of the word "lobotomise" is confusing. It implies a possibly permanent severing of a nerve fiber (if a glial scar forms) which is very slow to regrow in human biology. However with a cyberbrain to ecto or ego bridge this neuron-like structure is immediately restored in function (although linked to new 'ware). A human brain is in a constant state of neurogenesis (new neuron growth) and apoptosis (programmed cell death). Admittedly cell turnover is more active in the glial cells (the 90% of your brain that isn't neurons). However a brain with major depression can grow in volume and number of neurons 1.7% in 6 weeks (this is mostly neurogenesis and synaptogenesis) - so relatively rapid neuron growth/death/turnover can happen in a human brain (albeit recovering from a state of illness). So when your body induces programmed cell death on a faulty or senescent neuron, saying it "just lobotomises your brain one neuron at a time" isn't accurate either, as it doesn't tend to form a glial scar, so a new neuron might be able to migrate in. Using the word "lobotomise" for a process that kills a neuron and then immediately restores its function seems overdone to me.
—
"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."- Isoroku Yamamoto
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Wed, 2013-03-20 13:01
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:Yes. The
Ilmarinen wrote:
Yes. The lobotomized me and the copy me wouldn't be [i]each other[/i], but they would both be [i]me[/i].
When I say you I'm referring to the you that is alive right now and is typing things. I get that the two would be indistinguishable from the outside, but you understand that you only get to perceive things from one of them's perspective, right?
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Wed, 2013-03-20 13:04
VV VV's picture
Ilmarinen wrote:We replace
Ilmarinen wrote:
We replace every atom one by one over a period of several years. This is still you.
Yes.
Ilmarinen wrote:
We replace every atom all at once. I can't tell whether you agree that this is still you.
I'm not sure but I can't see a reason why it wouldn't be.
Ilmarinen wrote:
We take the exact same pattern of atoms and assemble them somewhere other than the starting location. I think you disagree that this is you.
I do, because you're making a new brain in some other location. I will never think using that brain (although it will think exactly as I did), I will never see through the eyes you hook it up to. It's not me, it's simply a copy.
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