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A little text I have been having in my drawer far too long, about the legal system on Extropia:
http://www.aleph.se/EclipsePhase/Law%20and%20Order.pdf
Please comment, I suspect there is plenty of room for development.
I think it is great that you're doing this :)
I have several comments:
Security companies in conflict negotiating cost allocation instead of shooting it out: I really, really like this :) It is one of those cases where a free market lets you make agreements that a safer and cheaper for everyone. It reminds me of virtual strikes: http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/1125/128.html
Lawcorps not ruling fairly: This isn't just due to their rep. Like with any other contract, you're going to have provisions for breach of contract. Unlike government judicial systems, you can go elsewhere to settle a dispute with a lawcorp.
Insurance companies require lots of capital: Not true. Even today insurance companies make reinsurance contracts to insure themselves against large losses.
Large threats against security companies: These guys need musketeer agreements or insurance policies to cover themselves against threats too large or costly for them to handle. Otherwise you can threaten them into backing down, and most customers wouldn't trust weak security companies.
Punishment for stealing: Here you suggest that you just pay the stolen item's worth. There are several problems with this. One is a complete lack of deterrent - it makes stealing risk-free, since at worst you just have to give the item (or its worth) back, maybe plus a small fee for the investigation costs. If you don't want society to devolve into crime, you need a deterrent with at least and expected loss from criminal actions for the vast majority of society, and that means the cost of getting caught must be larger than (item value / risk of getting caught). You could solve it partially with rep, but I'm not really happy about that one. Secondly, having your stuff stolen is more costly than the value of the item. We aren't just on the verge of selling all our possessions at the slightest price increase, so we value our possessions above market price. There is mental distress or at least annoyance from being the victim of theft, and there is inconvenience. Maybe a rule of thumb of 2-5 times the item's worth is more reasonable.
Punishment for violence and distress: I think you need to adress crimes that are not primarily about items with a market value. If you get beaten up, it shouldn't just be about compensation for medical bills and lost income. You should be compensated for the pain and discomfort, the distress, the opportunity cost (spare time and enjoyment has value too). Anarcho-capitalism takes freedom very seriously and it isn't just about stuff and money. Idea: some law corps set the compensation at the amount above which their bonus pater AI willingly subjects itself to the simulated crime...
Security companies striking deals a la "cheaper to take money and compensate client than to pursue": I'm not 100% sure of how far you think this goes, and I think it really needs to incorporate some game theoretical considerations of repeated games and posture. I sort of get the impression that if it there is an expected cost of 1,000 credits to pursue a thief to recover a 400 credit item and you don't think the thief can pay the fine (and there might even be a risk of not capturing the thief), then they're just going to give their client 400 credits instead of pursuing. This of course makes it risk free for thieves to steal items as long as the expected cost of pursuing outweighs the thief's expected ability to pay, which will end up being extremely costly for the company (and probably make the customers find a different security company). It makes sense in the single case, but it opens up yourself to exploitation, similar to the idea behind "never negotiate with terrorists".
In reality, what makes you open to exploitation is the predictability of the response (never pursue if it results in an expected loss). That doesn't mean the alternative is to ALWAYS pursue though. I expect that the optimal strategy is a random mixed strategy, where the randomness makes it impossible for a thief to be sure they won't pursue, and the probability of pursuit can factor in item value and pursuit costs but should be set to make it an expected loss for the thief to steal from the company's customers.
Risk, pollution, etc.: This is a major problem in ancap. How do you deal with people who expose you to risk? Is it ok to drive at reckless speeds through streets where kids might be crossing? You can't just rely on compensation from the driver afterwards, can you (even if there's little real death in EP)? If someone is polluting with carcinogens, do you have to wait until you get cancer to sue? My personal opinion is that ancap societies will develop common law that allows you to stop and demand compensation for exposing you to risk, where the common law dictates what constitutes acceptable levels of risk and is of course a constantly developing standard.
Reputation and ostracization: This tends to be major parts of anarchistic ideology. Some people just don't want to play along, but anarcho-capitalists of course don't think that justifies robbing you, and unlike other types of anarchism they can't restrict your access to essential resources. Reputation and ostracization could be used heavily. Of course there might still be unfavorable elements willing to deal with you, but your life could become very difficult if large parts of society won't deal with you or those you associate with. For a current day example, look at how labor unions can block an offending company from receiving goods and services from other organized companies. And while special interest groups can't lobby politicians in ancap society, they could subsidize competing companies to outbid the offending company on its major contracts.
Freeloading: On Extropia, quite conveniently everything is owned by Extropia Now and they charge rent to cover utilities and such, but a freeloading problem still remains. It is hard to imagine a society without defense, welfare, etc. and many people will be inclined to freeload without forced taxes. The obvious and perhaps only solution is through rep and ostracization. Say payments to "community companies" are made public and it makes you popular to do so. If you don't chip in at all, you take a serious rep hit. If one guy pays to welfare and the other to defense, that's exercising free choice and letting markets control policy, and they'd merely disagree like Democrats and Republicans since none of them are freeloading. Even when capitalism reigns supreme, or maybe especially when captilism reigns supreme, nothing gets people riled up like whenn they pay for something and the other guy gets it for free.
great logo...
I havent read the document yet (though I like everything I've read from Arena so far)
I decided to get into a new minatures game, and I will be modding and painting the minatures like classic Cylon centurians... I plan to use them in my EP game... so I decided to start a security company that uses weak un-meshed (un hackable) Synths based around them called "Cylon Security" with the catch phrase being... "By your command"
imagine my suprise when just now I found bunch of companies calling themselves "Cylon Security" (do a search yourself)
—
"what do I want? The usual — hundreds of grandchildren, complete dominion over the known worlds, and the pleasure of hearing that all my enemies have died in highly improbable accidents that cannot be connected to me."
Security companies in conflict negotiating cost allocation instead of shooting it out: I really, really like this :) It is one of those cases where a free market lets you make agreements that a safer and cheaper for everyone. It reminds me of virtual strikes: http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/1125/128.html
I love that idea! Virtual strikes makes a lot of sense, especially if implemented so that the incentives are right (you might not want to give the money to the government, since it might then want you to have more strikes).
Quote:
Lawcorps not ruling fairly: This isn't just due to their rep. Like with any other contract, you're going to have provisions for breach of contract. Unlike government judicial systems, you can go elsewhere to settle a dispute with a lawcorp.
One of the big risks is of course if one would get a near-monopoly. One of the big things for Extropia paranoids is figuring out how to keep competition strong enough that lawcorps and security corps do not get too strong economies of scale.
Quote:
Insurance companies require lots of capital: Not true. Even today insurance companies make reinsurance contracts to insure themselves against large losses.
Well, you need to pay reinsurance premiums. They can be fairly sizable. Under Solvency II rules you need to have capital enough to handle a one in a 200 year event; if it was all in reinsurance your premiums would presumably be a fraction of the total value insured divided by 200 - you better have some good cashflow.
(I am turning into an insurance nerd these days - sooner or later I will start to write about how Eclipse Phase insurance works.)
Quote:
Large threats against security companies: These guys need musketeer agreements or insurance policies to cover themselves against threats too large or costly for them to handle. Otherwise you can threaten them into backing down, and most customers wouldn't trust weak security companies.
Exactly. Again insurance stabilizes things nicely: there is going to be a certain rate of property damage and resleeving from the security companies that their insurers will pay, and by aggregating the risk it becomes more manageable. Hmm, the security market seems fairly similar to catastrophe and especially terrorism insurance markets (mostly quiet, occasional bursts of claims).
Ah, reinsurance might work for security firms too: re-security contracts. The local security company finds itself outgunned, so it calls in its contract with Medusan Shield. And a serious threat might actually lead to subsequent calls (a kind of security retrocession) where nearly every firm gets involved.
Same thing for super-specialized services like dealing with nanothreats, certain financial crimes or asyncs. Here you have specialists who get hired when needed.
Quote:
Punishment for stealing: Here you suggest that you just pay the stolen item's worth. There are several problems with this. One is a complete lack of deterrent - it makes stealing risk-free, since at worst you just have to give the item (or its worth) back, maybe plus a small fee for the investigation costs. If you don't want society to devolve into crime, you need a deterrent with at least and expected loss from criminal actions for the vast majority of society, and that means the cost of getting caught must be larger than (item value / risk of getting caught). You could solve it partially with rep, but I'm not really happy about that one. Secondly, having your stuff stolen is more costly than the value of the item. We aren't just on the verge of selling all our possessions at the slightest price increase, so we value our possessions above market price. There is mental distress or at least annoyance from being the victim of theft, and there is inconvenience. Maybe a rule of thumb of 2-5 times the item's worth is more reasonable.
I wonder what the market price for deterrence is? It seems that the trick is to make the investigation fee hefty, but enforcing an excessive fee will be tricky since it will be resisted by the perp's company support. It seems that there should be a market equilibrium somewhere, and maybe 2-5 times is reasonable.
This is where people's sense of retribution actually pushes towards a social good. Had they been neutral about it they would have accepted the return with no deterrence. Of course, deterrence is in itself not terribly strong, as criminology has demonstrated. I still think the rep hit is going to matter more (indeed, this might be an important role of security and law companies: they log what you do very clearly, and it will influence your rep).
Quote:
Punishment for violence and distress: I think you need to adress crimes that are not primarily about items with a market value. If you get beaten up, it shouldn't just be about compensation for medical bills and lost income. You should be compensated for the pain and discomfort, the distress, the opportunity cost (spare time and enjoyment has value too). Anarcho-capitalism takes freedom very seriously and it isn't just about stuff and money. Idea: some law corps set the compensation at the amount above which their bonus pater AI willingly subjects itself to the simulated crime...
Hehehe... "Crime solved in 30 minutes, or the CEO will subject herself to it!" I love the idea. Gimmicky, but makes sense.
Different people also rate different kinds of distress differently, so they might have contracts reflecting this. But it will likely be with different law companies rather than varying contracts with the law company, I assume. The real problem is proving distress, but XP and brain scans actually allow objective measurement in some cases.
Quote:
Security companies striking deals a la "cheaper to take money and compensate client than to pursue": I'm not 100% sure of how far you think this goes, and I think it really needs to incorporate some game theoretical considerations of repeated games and posture.
Definitely. This can easily produce very unhappy customers and bad reputations, and sometimes standing up for Justice, Free Enterprise and the Extropian Way of Life is worth more PR than any amount of damaged bots. Just imagine the joy in the marketing department of finding some Jovian saboteurs in their sights...
[/quote] In reality, what makes you open to exploitation is the predictability of the response (never pursue if it results in an expected loss). That doesn't mean the alternative is to ALWAYS pursue though. I expect that the optimal strategy is a random mixed strategy, where the randomness makes it impossible for a thief to be sure they won't pursue, and the probability of pursuit can factor in item value and pursuit costs but should be set to make it an expected loss for the thief to steal from the company's customers.
[/quote]
Yes, the randomness is important. Especially since your real opponent isn't the thief, but his company. So they will be just as good at game theory as you are.
Quote:
Risk, pollution, etc.: This is a major problem in ancap. How do you deal with people who expose you to risk? Is it ok to drive at reckless speeds through streets where kids might be crossing? You can't just rely on compensation from the driver afterwards, can you (even if there's little real death in EP)? If someone is polluting with carcinogens, do you have to wait until you get cancer to sue? My personal opinion is that ancap societies will develop common law that allows you to stop and demand compensation for exposing you to risk, where the common law dictates what constitutes acceptable levels of risk and is of course a constantly developing standard.
You can also aggregate torts. The doctrinaire ancap answer to pollution is that everybody sues the polluter for infringing on their property - he is messing up *their* air or space. The problem is that this gets complex and messy. In normal law this might be dealt with class action suits. In ancap you can do it commercially: some companies aggregate everybody's microtorts and run an effective macrotort against the polluter. In fact, many people probably subscribe to such aggregator services or get them through their lawcorps.
The risk problem is more subtle: there is a background risk induced just by existing or doing *anything*. So can anybody sue? Or what about spreading pork aerosols that somebody on OpenSharia breathes in? Or just looking disgusting enough to cause distress? This is where common law in the form of standard agreements between the law associations and lawcorps start to play a role. I think this quickly stabilizes into something akin to "community standards": a minimal level of risk, distress or other annoyance that lawcorps will pursue, occasionally nudged as standards shift or particular people make cases.
Quote:
Reputation and ostracization: This tends to be major parts of anarchistic ideology. Some people just don't want to play along, but anarcho-capitalists of course don't think that justifies robbing you, and unlike other types of anarchism they can't restrict your access to essential resources. Reputation and ostracization could be used heavily. Of course there might still be unfavorable elements willing to deal with you, but your life could become very difficult if large parts of society won't deal with you or those you associate with. For a current day example, look at how labor unions can block an offending company from receiving goods and services from other organized companies. And while special interest groups can't lobby politicians in ancap society, they could subsidize competing companies to outbid the offending company on its major contracts.
But Extropia is based on voluntary interactions and contracts. So there is nothing one community can do to maintain ostracism if others do not want to follow their example; they have to be like the Hortators in Robert C. Wright's "The Golden Age" and convince key actors and the majority to go along strong ostracism (in that novel they had an easier time since there were a handful of key resources controlled by key people playing along). One trick some groups might use is to embed fine print about shunning certain people into their contracts: if you want to use OpenSharia you have to shun apostates.
I think rep is more effective than shunning, but thanks to AR ignoring people can be truly effective. You killfile somebody, and your muse will now edit them away from your sensorium.
Quote:
Freeloading: On Extropia, quite conveniently everything is owned by Extropia Now and they charge rent to cover utilities and such, but a freeloading problem still remains. It is hard to imagine a society without defense, welfare, etc. and many people will be inclined to freeload without forced taxes. The obvious and perhaps only solution is through rep and ostracization. Say payments to "community companies" are made public and it makes you popular to do so. If you don't chip in at all, you take a serious rep hit. If one guy pays to welfare and the other to defense, that's exercising free choice and letting markets control policy, and they'd merely disagree like Democrats and Republicans since none of them are freeloading. Even when capitalism reigns supreme, or maybe especially when captilism reigns supreme, nothing gets people riled up like whenn they pay for something and the other guy gets it for free.
You can also show off by paying for useful things. Everybody loves to have a memorial public matter compiler that clearly states who paid for it.
I got the impression from the book that Extropia Now is not running things very actively, just the things needed to get everything going. Their basic services are likely super-basic. The bulk of the public goods are likely supplied by foundations that are supported by company donations. That way they can be tuned to different ideological and practical goals too.
A few extra notes:
Security corps might make standing or temporary agreement between each other to limit the rules of engagement, decreasing collateral damage and asset loss (possibly even to the point of using training rounds, but more likely more modest bans). While the Ultimates are unlikely to agree to such things, more business-oriented corps might agree to at least start with less lethal weapons, with modest fines for the first party to escalate the conflict to the next level as defined by a set agreement on escalation.
I think the insurance corps help control risky/dangerous behavior to a certain extent. They see you speeding out of control, you get a notification that your premiums are going up, as per your contract, possibly with a running counter on your entopics until you stop. It is by no means a perfect system, but what system is?