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If you could resleeve, would you?

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Tue, 2010-06-22 22:28
#1
Hakkonen Hakkonen's picture
If you could resleeve, would you?
If the technology for resleeving, and the variety of morphs, depicted in Eclipse Phase existed today, would you take the plunge? I would. For me, it's a no brainer. I would sample as many morphs as I could afford while staying reasonably sane. I'd spend a year as a woman, as an octopus, as a machine, as a surya... when you have such a mind-boggling opportunity, not just to study another perspective, but to experience it firsthand, how can you not seize it?
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Wed, 2010-06-23 10:07
TBRMInsanity TBRMInsanity's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
I would totally get a cortical stack installed but I wouldn't resleeve unless I had to (ie I died, was horribly deformed, or my body in general was made useless). Resleeving will have a HUGE social impact and I imagine that a lot of people will be against it right off the bat. That being said, people with a cortical stack should get a good rate for their life insurance (maybe they only need to pay the deductible to get resleeved).
—
Jovian Motto: Your mind is original. Preserve it. Your body is a temple. Maintain it. Immortality is an illusion. Forget it.
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Wed, 2010-06-23 10:08
nezumi.hebereke nezumi.hebereke's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
Given where I am right now, I'd probably choose to modify my current "morph" first, then, later in life, hop to another one. I say this both because it'll help me save up so I can afford better, and because really, I'm in a good place right now, and I'd feel wasteful to throw away a perfectly good body. While I would like to try out being a woman and so on (which can be done with augmentation), I don't feel any particular affinity to octopi. Of course, if the morph happens to be somewhere cool like on Mars or around the corona of the Sun, then it's a different question.
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Wed, 2010-06-23 15:43
Byzantine Laser Byzantine Laser's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
I completely would, for reasons I won't needlessly go into. In a modern environment where it's a rarity, though, I might go out of my way to avoid the disruption it would cause... changing jobs or moving around the same time it happened.
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Wed, 2010-06-23 17:56
GreyBrother GreyBrother's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
Yes, i probably would as far as money isn't a concern and it's safe. And it probably would be a Synthmorph, Synth or Swarmanoid.
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Wed, 2010-06-23 18:25
King Shere King Shere's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
I would discard my mortal husk in a heartbeat, even if "'I" wasnt transfered & mearly copied.
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Wed, 2010-06-23 19:53
puke puke's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
fork and merge. the only problem would be that all my alpha forks would end up battling to the death to be the primary consiousness, and i'd end up right back where i started. also, dead multiple times over.
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Wed, 2010-06-23 20:36
Quincey Forder Quincey Forder's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
I would, in a heartbeat and become an informorph for a while if having to sleeve, probably an Olympian or a Bouncer or maybe a Flexbot and going Terminator on the bioconcervative. Heck, I'd fork myself and send my fork to the central points of the old religions and nuke them. I'd probably try and bring forth the Singularity and the Fall. Full fledged tabula rasa
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Sun, 2010-06-27 19:34
Epsilon Fork Epsilon Fork's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
No. I'd take a cortical stack, but as there is no transmission of consciousness I'd rather not die for no reason. I'd fork and fork and fork until Agent Smith looked like an underdog, but why would any of us would "resleeve?" It's suicide by another term.
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Sun, 2010-06-27 20:26
TBRMInsanity TBRMInsanity's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
Epsilon Fork wrote:
No. I'd take a cortical stack, but as there is no transmission of consciousness I'd rather not die for no reason. I'd fork and fork and fork until Agent Smith looked like an underdog, but why would any of us would "resleeve?" It's suicide by another term.
I couldn't have said it better myself.
—
Jovian Motto: Your mind is original. Preserve it. Your body is a temple. Maintain it. Immortality is an illusion. Forget it.
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Sun, 2010-06-27 22:39
Decivre Decivre's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
Epsilon Fork wrote:
No. I'd take a cortical stack, but as there is no transmission of consciousness I'd rather not die for no reason. I'd fork and fork and fork until Agent Smith looked like an underdog, but why would any of us would "resleeve?" It's suicide by another term.
Not really. Remember that live transmission results in no loss of continuity; so far as a person knows, their mind is literally shifting to another body and they are awake during the whole transition. So long as I can do it that way, I have no fears about resleeving. I'd probably at least do it once, largely for the purpose of getting into a body better than my current one and for no other purpose. Otherwise I would likely only resort to forking.
—
Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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Mon, 2010-06-28 01:06
Epsilon Fork Epsilon Fork's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
Decivre wrote:
Not really. Remember that live transmission results in no loss of continuity; so far as a person knows, their mind is literally shifting to another body and they are awake during the whole transition. So long as I can do it that way, I have no fears about resleeving. I'd probably at least do it once, largely for the purpose of getting into a body better than my current one and for no other purpose. Otherwise I would likely only resort to forking.
That's just the rub, isn't it? Live transmission results in no loss of *perceived* continuity. But you are engaging in the crassest form of dualism if you are presuming some indefinable piece of "self" is transferred from one structure to the next during the process. If I replace my hand, am I not still me? My arm to the elbow, my arm to the shoulder, my arms, legs. Replace my body a piece at a time and when is it exactly that I cease to be? What is the fundamental physical form of "me"? This is the philosophical question that live transmission is trying to cover up, but it's pants are showing. Suppose I had an alpha fork that I dump into a sleeve after first editing this forks memory of a) sleeving, and b) the psychosurgery. It wakes up, and remembers a continuity of self that is false, but has the same effect of live transmission: the individual has perceived continuity of self.
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Mon, 2010-06-28 02:34
Decivre Decivre's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
Epsilon Fork wrote:
That's just the rub, isn't it? Live transmission results in no loss of *perceived* continuity. But you are engaging in the crassest form of dualism if you are presuming some indefinable piece of "self" is transferred from one structure to the next during the process. If I replace my hand, am I not still me? My arm to the elbow, my arm to the shoulder, my arms, legs. Replace my body a piece at a time and when is it exactly that I cease to be? What is the fundamental physical form of "me"? This is the philosophical question that live transmission is trying to cover up, but it's pants are showing. Suppose I had an alpha fork that I dump into a sleeve after first editing this forks memory of a) sleeving, and b) the psychosurgery. It wakes up, and remembers a continuity of self that is false, but has the same effect of live transmission: the individual has perceived continuity of self.
We could use that logic in everyday life! Why go to sleep if there is no evidence that the "you" that sleeps is the same "you" that wakes up? Why continue to live if the "you" of the end of the day isn't the same "you" from the beginning of the day? To that end, the dilemma of the Ship of Theseus is a hard one to proscribe to this scenario. Your body replaces virtually every cell within it every decade or so. Hell, within the context of your first seven years, the body that you had as an infant is no more. If maintaining your fundamental sense of self is so important, than uploading yourself into a permanent, electronic shell should be of your utmost concern... if not for immortality, at least to rid yourself permanently of this decade-long cycle of self-destruction and recreation. For me, philosophical worries are no concern. I've never believed in the concept of a soul, nor have I ever doubted my own sense of self. Even if I were to find out that every memory within my mind were a complete lie, I'd still know that I am who I am (even if my identity is a fabrication). I tie my sense of self solely to my sense of existence, not my memory thereof. If more than one of me exists at a time, I don't think of any one of them as an original... but as every one of them being the original all at once. I don't see why there need be any special trait inherent in being the first of anything, and as I've told many people before: "The only thing more awesome than me is extra me on the side." Also, I think it fair to note that it doesn't seem possible to start up a mind with continuity unless it has already been running in some way. To me, continuity should never be an issue, even with large-distance egocasting; much like with save states in a hardware emulator, your ego should be paused at the very moment of shutdown and restarted at that moment without it ever being the wiser. Continuity should always exist outside of sleep and death. However, this doesn't seem to be the case in Eclipse Phase. Any mind started up seems to know its being started up, and feels all the effects thereof... and I don't really understand why.
—
Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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Mon, 2010-06-28 03:13
Epsilon Fork Epsilon Fork's picture
Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
I don't know the Ship of Theseus argument by name, would you mind educating me? As far as the decade long cycle of full replacement of the body, why would that change in a resleeve? Parts wear out in any system thanks to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics. Whether there is or isn't anything special about being the first is a different argument, but I'm also not making that argument. Other forks are their own people, but there is no reason I should end the mePrime so that I can make a meAlpha line of me. The swarm sleeve people live by this every day, as they are nothing more than a large collection of similar versions of themself. And if it doesn't seem possible to start up a mind with continuity unless it had already been running that way, I refer you to anterograde amnesia.
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anterograde_amnesia
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 03:52
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    I don't know the Ship of Theseus argument by name, would you mind educating me? As far as the decade long cycle of full replacement of the body, why would that change in a resleeve? Parts wear out in any system thanks to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics. Whether there is or isn't anything special about being the first is a different argument, but I'm also not making that argument. Other forks are their own people, but there is no reason I should end the mePrime so that I can make a meAlpha line of me. The swarm sleeve people live by this every day, as they are nothing more than a large collection of similar versions of themself. And if it doesn't seem possible to start up a mind with continuity unless it had already been running that way, I refer you to anterograde amnesia.
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anterograde_amnesia
    • It's not an argument, but a philosophical paradox, and basically the one you brought up. Basically it is based on a legend where the Ship of Theseus was recovered by the Athenians and it was refurbished piece by piece to its original glory... but every single piece of the original ship was replaced. Afterwards, the scholars had a debate as to whether the ship that stood before them was the Ship of Theseus, or if it was the debris that lay at their feet. In that same vein, we could argue a similar point about humans, and the fact that the human body replaces virtually every cell within it over the course of a decade. Are you the same person you were 10 years ago, or is that person long dead, their remnants discarded or consumed by the person existing now? The biggest difference between our opinions is the fact that you draw a distinction between forks, whereas I do not. I do not see the existence of a mePrime, or meAlpha... just a me. There can be as many "me"s running as I theoretically have bodies or emulators to run, but they are all just me. Swarms, however, don't seem to contain a multitude of forks; they instead seem to contain a single ego ran within cloud processing systems networked within the swarm. Essentially the swarm acts as a distributed network running a single mind. As for continuity, I wasn't arguing whether it was possible... I was simply stating how the mechanics of the game work. Personally, I don't think that continuity checks should ever be a necessity, since to me a mind that is shut down and restarted should never realize that there was any off time (much like the save state of any hardware emulation), unless they were shut off during a period of sleep or other unconsciousness (at which point it would simply be an extended period of sleep or unconsciousness). However, the mechanics of the game state that unless you are kept fully conscious and aware during any resleeve or egocast, you experience a loss of continuity. It doesn't make sense to me, but that is how the game works. Perhaps I should bring it up in another thread as a question to the developers.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 04:19
    Epsilon Fork Epsilon Fork's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Decivre wrote:
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    I don't know the Ship of Theseus argument by name, would you mind educating me? As far as the decade long cycle of full replacement of the body, why would that change in a resleeve? Parts wear out in any system thanks to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics. Whether there is or isn't anything special about being the first is a different argument, but I'm also not making that argument. Other forks are their own people, but there is no reason I should end the mePrime so that I can make a meAlpha line of me. The swarm sleeve people live by this every day, as they are nothing more than a large collection of similar versions of themself. And if it doesn't seem possible to start up a mind with continuity unless it had already been running that way, I refer you to anterograde amnesia.
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anterograde_amnesia
    • It's not an argument, but a philosophical paradox, and basically the one you brought up. Basically it is based on a legend where the Ship of Theseus was recovered by the Athenians and it was refurbished piece by piece to its original glory... but every single piece of the original ship was replaced. Afterwards, the scholars had a debate as to whether the ship that stood before them was the Ship of Theseus, or if it was the debris that lay at their feet. In that same vein, we could argue a similar point about humans, and the fact that the human body replaces virtually every cell within it over the course of a decade. Are you the same person you were 10 years ago, or is that person long dead, their remnants discarded or consumed by the person existing now? The biggest difference between our opinions is the fact that you draw a distinction between forks, whereas I do not. I do not see the existence of a mePrime, or meAlpha... just a me. There can be as many "me"s running as I theoretically have bodies or emulators to run, but they are all just me. Swarms, however, don't seem to contain a multitude of forks; they instead seem to contain a single ego ran within cloud processing systems networked within the swarm. Essentially the swarm acts as a distributed network running a single mind. As for continuity, I wasn't arguing whether it was possible... I was simply stating how the mechanics of the game work. Personally, I don't think that continuity checks should ever be a necessity, since to me a mind that is shut down and restarted should never realize that there was any off time (much like the save state of any hardware emulation), unless they were shut off during a period of sleep or other unconsciousness (at which point it would simply be an extended period of sleep or unconsciousness). However, the mechanics of the game state that unless you are kept fully conscious and aware during any resleeve or egocast, you experience a loss of continuity. It doesn't make sense to me, but that is how the game works. Perhaps I should bring it up in another thread as a question to the developers.
    I don't know the mechanics of the game very well, as I've played in a sum total of one game night so far. As to your declaration that you and all forks of you are part of the same "me": what makes you think you have a right to think that? Isn't assuming that every version of you will follow the same path tantamount to removing all of the forks' freedom of self? "My Grandfather's Axe" being the current version of the paradox, I assume? I would argue that once you have made an alpha fork, they are an individual to whom you are fully responsible for the shape it is made in. If I were a beta Fork (bMe), I would hold my downgrade against my creator (aMe) as a matter of nature and principle. I would hold my downgraded nature against them unless they could sufficiently convince bMe that there was an expected benefit to this particular bMe that I happen to be. An Epsilon Fork (eMe) would have every right to come after mePrime ('Me) like Bladerunners.
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 04:53
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    I don't know the mechanics of the game very well, as I've played in a sum total of one game night so far. As to your declaration that you and all forks of you are part of the same "me": what makes you think you have a right to think that? Isn't assuming that every version of you will follow the same path tantamount to removing all of the forks' freedom of self? "My Grandfather's Axe" being the current version of the paradox, I assume? I would argue that once you have made an alpha fork, they are an individual to whom you are fully responsible for the shape it is made in. If I were a beta Fork (bMe), I would hold my downgrade against my creator (aMe) as a matter of nature and principle. I would hold my downgraded nature against them unless they could sufficiently convince bMe that there was an expected benefit to this particular bMe that I happen to be. An Epsilon Fork (eMe) would have every right to come after mePrime ('Me) like Bladerunners.
    I find it ironic that you would state that my personal beliefs of the concept of forking would remove my "copies'" freedom of self. Isn't my belief on how I see copies of my mind part of my freedom of self? Wouldn't copies of my mind have a similar, if not identical, opinion on sense of self as I do, and therefore restrict their own freedoms of self in the same way that I do mine? To that end, I never stated that every copy of me would follow the same path. I have every expectation that they will all follow different paths, knowing full well that there is already another "me" following the other paths taken. This does not necessitate that I declare them all different people altogether, however. They are all still facets, avatars, or whatever other term you might use... for me. Despite being anything but Christian, I can't help but draw allusions to the Catholic concept of the Holy Trinity. They believe that Jesus, God and the Holy Spirit all have their own personalities, own minds... but are one and the same person. In that same vein, I have no desire to draw some sort of dividing line between various copies of my mind as different people... in fact, I think it can be detrimental. Discerning which mind is the "original" can already create a point of derision between you and your "copies". It creates a potential reason to feel inferior, and I see no need for that. Moreover, to me there really isn't a way to create this dividing line in the first place. If you have a "perfect copy" of something, and you can still denote which one is the original, then the copy isn't as "perfect" as you might have thought, no? I would never wish a feeling of inferiority upon myself, and therefore would never wish it upon any number of myself for the same reason. It is because of this that I feel that all "copies" of me are me, and feel no need to give them numbers, declare any one the original, or try and set any other specific label. Perhaps we might try and sub-label ourselves based on the various paths we take ("Decivre the programmer", "Decivre the researcher" and "Decivre the doctor", for instance), but nothing beyond that. Lastly yes, the Ship of Theseus paradox goes under a multitude of names: My Grandfather's/Abraham Lincoln's/George Washington's Axe, Heraclitus' River, Plato's Carriage, Locke's Socks, and The Family/Jeannot's Knife being the ones I know.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 09:43
    Epsilon Fork Epsilon Fork's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Decivre wrote:
    I find it ironic that you would state that my personal beliefs of the concept of forking would remove my "copies'" freedom of self. Isn't my belief on how I see copies of my mind part of my freedom of self? Wouldn't copies of my mind have a similar, if not identical, opinion on sense of self as I do, and therefore restrict their own freedoms of self in the same way that I do mine?
    I am aware that I used the deceitful rhetorical tactic of putting words in your mouth, yes. And you ask an interesting question: Would your forks have similar opinions of self? Probably. Does this make you one macro "me"? I don't think so, it's the same kind of assumption that Hobbes makes in Leviathan: anthropomorphizing a group with the traits of an individual. Your relation to your fork would be closer to that of a twin than that of a mesh network of self.
    Decivre wrote:
    To that end, I never stated that every copy of me would follow the same path. I have every expectation that they will all follow different paths, knowing full well that there is already another "me" following the other paths taken. This does not necessitate that I declare them all different people altogether, however. They are all still facets, avatars, or whatever other term you might use... for me.
    If you clone yourself and were to be able to play a tape of your life up to an arbitrary point into it's mind, is that a facet of you? How does sharing the exact same genetics and nearly identical set of experiences create more than two similar individuals? What if someone cloned you and played a tape of your life into it, but you didn't know it had been done. If you ran into this clone later, what then? It seems unlikely this stranger is going to be "you".
    Decivre wrote:
    Despite being anything but Christian, I can't help but draw allusions to the Catholic concept of the Holy Trinity. They believe that Jesus, God and the Holy Spirit all have their own personalities, own minds... but are one and the same person. In that same vein, I have no desire to draw some sort of dividing line between various copies of my mind as different people... in fact, I think it can be detrimental. Discerning which mind is the "original" can already create a point of derision between you and your "copies". It creates a potential reason to feel inferior, and I see no need for that.
    Id/Ego/Superego, Hun/Po/Qui, yes, there are numerous systems of divinity and psychology that speak of this, but in all of those cases (not the Trinity, that's got a few dozen different traits to it that don't fit with what you are alluding to) they are all running on the same hardware/wetware/arteware so are merged. I do think the game system has the rules for forks diverging over time, which is why reintegration gets harder.
    Decivre wrote:
    Moreover, to me there really isn't a way to create this dividing line in the first place. If you have a "perfect copy" of something, and you can still denote which one is the original, then the copy isn't as "perfect" as you might have thought, no?
    My point exactly. I feel that any fork of myself has the moral right to at least the same level of self actualization the original had, so should be no different, and I shouldn't have to tell which the original was. If I mar my copy in some way, I had best be prepared to explain to them why I did it.
    Decivre wrote:
    I would never wish a feeling of inferiority upon myself, and therefore would never wish it upon any number of myself for the same reason. It is because of this that I feel that all "copies" of me are me, and feel no need to give them numbers, declare any one the original, or try and set any other specific label. Perhaps we might try and sub-label ourselves based on the various paths we take ("Decivre the programmer", "Decivre the researcher" and "Decivre the doctor", for instance), but nothing beyond that.
    I get the feeling we are arguing for the same thing, but are having semantic difficulties.
    Decivre wrote:
    Lastly yes, the Ship of Theseus paradox goes under a multitude of names: My Grandfather's/Abraham Lincoln's/George Washington's Axe, Heraclitus' River, Plato's Carriage, Locke's Socks, and The Family/Jeannot's Knife being the ones I know.
    Neat.
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 10:32
    nezumi.hebereke nezumi.hebereke's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    I feel like we're dancing around the basic questions - what defines 'you' (or 'identity'), and what defines 'life'. I myself take a fairly exclusive view of identity, and I'm not sure right now on life. I do not view 'me' at age 7 as 'me', or even a facet of me. There are things he knew and believed in that I do not, and vice versa. I feel fairly comfortable saying that that person is dead (or at least, more dead than alive). My brother is more of a facet of me than that 7-year-old is. On that grounds, I do not feel that a bunch of forks of me would be 'me' for very long, although that's partially because I know how intentionally contrary and difficult I am, and I know if I were a fork of myself, I would go out of my way to cease being 'photocopy of X'. I also don't know that this form of death is a bad thing. It seems like a 1:1 trade - the old 'me' leaves a memory capsule of sorts, with his most valuable beliefs, thoughts and memories, which is taken on by the new me, and so on, resulting in the new me having both the best traits of the old me, plus some new traits which, hopefully, average out to be better overall. Yes, I have intentionally tried to avoid going to sleep because I felt like it would be an end to that stream of consciousness, a form of death, but the truth is, that sort of thing is ultimately impossible, and in the long term it prevented me from passing on my best traits for when my consciousness starts up again. I describe the above in a rather discrete sense, although obviously (with the possible exception of sleep), it's a more gradual transition. At this moment, the me of yesterday is gradually dying, as my beliefs and memories change, while the me of tomorrow is forming, but there's no definite point where me of 6/24/10 is dead or where 6/26/10 me is initially concieved. It's all just a long process of recycling.
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 11:30
    TBRMInsanity TBRMInsanity's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    nezumi.hebereke wrote:
    I feel like we're dancing around the basic questions - what defines 'you' (or 'identity'), and what defines 'life'. I myself take a fairly exclusive view of identity, and I'm not sure right now on life. I do not view 'me' at age 7 as 'me', or even a facet of me. There are things he knew and believed in that I do not, and vice versa. I feel fairly comfortable saying that that person is dead (or at least, more dead than alive). My brother is more of a facet of me than that 7-year-old is. On that grounds, I do not feel that a bunch of forks of me would be 'me' for very long, although that's partially because I know how intentionally contrary and difficult I am, and I know if I were a fork of myself, I would go out of my way to cease being 'photocopy of X'. I also don't know that this form of death is a bad thing. It seems like a 1:1 trade - the old 'me' leaves a memory capsule of sorts, with his most valuable beliefs, thoughts and memories, which is taken on by the new me, and so on, resulting in the new me having both the best traits of the old me, plus some new traits which, hopefully, average out to be better overall. Yes, I have intentionally tried to avoid going to sleep because I felt like it would be an end to that stream of consciousness, a form of death, but the truth is, that sort of thing is ultimately impossible, and in the long term it prevented me from passing on my best traits for when my consciousness starts up again. I describe the above in a rather discrete sense, although obviously (with the possible exception of sleep), it's a more gradual transition. At this moment, the me of yesterday is gradually dying, as my beliefs and memories change, while the me of tomorrow is forming, but there's no definite point where me of 6/24/10 is dead or where 6/26/10 me is initially concieved. It's all just a long process of recycling.
    What your describing is similar to what is described in Ray Kurswell's Age of Spiritual Machines. We (the true self) are a pattern, an ever changing pattern of thoughts, ideas, and beliefs. When the time comes that we can map our conscience into a computer (ie resleeving), our identity will be that ever changing pattern. Regardless of weather or not outsiders view this pattern as being you is redundant as this patter will view itself as you. Like wise the most likely future evolution of humanity will more then likely be robots with human minds inside. From a biological point of view they will not be human, but from a social, and psychological point of view, they will continue to call themselves human. Homo Roboticus.
    —
    Jovian Motto: Your mind is original. Preserve it. Your body is a temple. Maintain it. Immortality is an illusion. Forget it.
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 12:28
    Epsilon Fork Epsilon Fork's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    TBRMInsanity wrote:
    What your describing is similar to what is described in Ray Kurswell's Age of Spiritual Machines. We (the true self) are a pattern, an ever changing pattern of thoughts, ideas, and beliefs. When the time comes that we can map our conscience into a computer (ie resleeving), our identity will be that ever changing pattern. Regardless of weather or not outsiders view this pattern as being you is redundant as this patter will view itself as you. Like wise the most likely future evolution of humanity will more then likely be robots with human minds inside. From a biological point of view they will not be human, but from a social, and psychological point of view, they will continue to call themselves human. Homo Roboticus.
    Last I checked (which was a few years ago, I admit) Neuropsychology hadn't gotten close to being able to define things like 'self' or the 'seat of consciousness' or any real pattern like you are referring to, so from a scientific standpoint these questions are still in the realm of religion and philosophy. If anyone is aware of any published papers on the subject that can bring this discussion down to hypothesis, I would be be most grateful.
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 13:33
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    I am aware that I used the deceitful rhetorical tactic of putting words in your mouth, yes. And you ask an interesting question: Would your forks have similar opinions of self? Probably. Does this make you one macro "me"? I don't think so, it's the same kind of assumption that Hobbes makes in Leviathan: anthropomorphizing a group with the traits of an individual. Your relation to your fork would be closer to that of a twin than that of a mesh network of self.
    Somewhat, and not quite. Unless there are twins out there who consider each other to be the same person, my relationship with my forks will still be somewhat different. I would, however, consider them equals... and not define any one of them to be a macro "me"
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    If you clone yourself and were to be able to play a tape of your life up to an arbitrary point into it's mind, is that a facet of you? How does sharing the exact same genetics and nearly identical set of experiences create more than two similar individuals? What if someone cloned you and played a tape of your life into it, but you didn't know it had been done. If you ran into this clone later, what then? It seems unlikely this stranger is going to be "you".
    It depends on how far back this "copy" of me were created prior to our meeting. However, I don't think that playing a tape to a clone will be quite the same as forking someone, nor do I think that making a clone is the same as making a copy. Genetics, in my opinion, does little in comparison to life experiences in defining who we are. I've met enough twins to know that. Even if they had lived very different lives past a certain point, forks would likely be very similar in very eerie ways. Of course, how close this similarity will be may depend heavily on the point of forking, and the degree of shared experiences they have.
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    Id/Ego/Superego, Hun/Po/Qui, yes, there are numerous systems of divinity and psychology that speak of this, but in all of those cases (not the Trinity, that's got a few dozen different traits to it that don't fit with what you are alluding to) they are all running on the same hardware/wetware/arteware so are merged. I do think the game system has the rules for forks diverging over time, which is why reintegration gets harder.
    Well, of course there are traits to the trinity which don't quite mesh with my concept of self. I don't consider my self an omnipotent being, the creator of the universe, nor do I deign to become a being of worship. However, the basic principle of having multiple bodies and minds, while still being the same person, fits perfectly with my own philosophy. Neither Id/Ego/Superego nor Hun/Po/Qui fit, because I don't consider each fork to be parts of a whole... all of them are wholes unto themselves. However, I still see each of those wholes as being me.
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    My point exactly. I feel that any fork of myself has the moral right to at least the same level of self actualization the original had, so should be no different, and I shouldn't have to tell which the original was. If I mar my copy in some way, I had best be prepared to explain to them why I did it.
    I don't see myself doing any neural pruning to any of my forks. I'm the sort of person that can't even neuter a dog because I myself would be pissed if someone cut off my balls... so I don't see any situation in which I would hobble one of myself without uniform consent. If any one of us was hobbled in some way, it would be something they agreed to.
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    I get the feeling we are arguing for the same thing, but are having semantic difficulties.
    Perhaps. I just think we are coming close, but not quite meeting at a point.
    —
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 14:45
    TBRMInsanity TBRMInsanity's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    Last I checked (which was a few years ago, I admit) Neuropsychology hadn't gotten close to being able to define things like 'self' or the 'seat of consciousness' or any real pattern like you are referring to, so from a scientific standpoint these questions are still in the realm of religion and philosophy. If anyone is aware of any published papers on the subject that can bring this discussion down to hypothesis, I would be be most grateful.
    You are right there are no definitive results that map out our consciousness in our brains, only areas of the brain that are responsible for different types of thinking (emotions, logic, perception, etc). But since when is science fiction, science fact? Further more why should future speculation be dismissed until the point when science proves it to be true? If everyone followed that mode of thinking then we would still be burning people at the steak for saying the world is round. I'm not saying that Mr. Kurzwell is 100% correct and that we will eventually all be downloaded into a computer so we can live forever, but I at least accept that the possibility could exist in the future, and that the details of how it will be done will be figured out in said future.
    —
    Jovian Motto: Your mind is original. Preserve it. Your body is a temple. Maintain it. Immortality is an illusion. Forget it.
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 15:11
    Epsilon Fork Epsilon Fork's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    TBRMInsanity wrote:
    You are right there are no definitive results that map out our consciousness in our brains, only areas of the brain that are responsible for different types of thinking (emotions, logic, perception, etc). But since when is science fiction, science fact? Further more why should future speculation be dismissed until the point when science proves it to be true? If everyone followed that mode of thinking then we would still be burning people at the steak for saying the world is round. I'm not saying that Mr. Kurzwell is 100% correct and that we will eventually all be downloaded into a computer so we can live forever, but I at least accept that the possibility could exist in the future, and that the details of how it will be done will be figured out in said future.
    Oh, I'm not wanting to squash speculation, I'm just curious as to where we are vs where we are dreaming of.
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 15:55
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    TBRMInsanity wrote:
    You are right there are no definitive results that map out our consciousness in our brains, only areas of the brain that are responsible for different types of thinking (emotions, logic, perception, etc). But since when is science fiction, science fact? Further more why should future speculation be dismissed until the point when science proves it to be true? If everyone followed that mode of thinking then we would still be burning people at the steak for saying the world is round. I'm not saying that Mr. Kurzwell is 100% correct and that we will eventually all be downloaded into a computer so we can live forever, but I at least accept that the possibility could exist in the future, and that the details of how it will be done will be figured out in said future.
    While I agree that science fiction and fact aren't one and the same, this isn't the complete case when talking about biological emulation. Understanding what every mental process does is not necessary in order to facilitate producing a computer that can emulate the functions of our mental processes. A perfect example of this in practice can be seen with protein folding. We have already created software which can simulate the folding of protein, and we are using it to understand why proteins fold the way they do. We are actually using the simulations to understand the process, rather than using our understanding of the process to make the simulations. In that same vein, I have no doubt that our understanding of the human mind will not advance nearly as far until we have computer hardware with the capacity to emulate the human brain. The question really isn't "if", because we know that a computer can simulate biological processes, and that the brain and all other components of the body work by a complex series of biological processes. The only real question is when we'll have a computer capable of that many processes within a reasonable period of time.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 16:21
    TBRMInsanity TBRMInsanity's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    There is defintly more work to be done to fully understand the biological processes that make use think. I do believe that the ability to map a mind into a computer (simulating current neural pathways) won't occur till shortly before, or after the technological singularity.
    —
    Jovian Motto: Your mind is original. Preserve it. Your body is a temple. Maintain it. Immortality is an illusion. Forget it.
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 18:12
    Arenamontanus Arenamontanus's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    Last I checked (which was a few years ago, I admit) Neuropsychology hadn't gotten close to being able to define things like 'self' or the 'seat of consciousness' or any real pattern like you are referring to, so from a scientific standpoint these questions are still in the realm of religion and philosophy.
    Things do not have to be settled into science in order to be studied and clarified. Philosophy has done a quite extensive job on different models of selfhood, but most of it is of course inaccessibly jargon-filled. Still, this thread demonstrates that plenty of concepts that were pretty far out and technical just a few decades ago are now part of *popular culture*! If you read Parfit's classic "Reasons and Persons" (1984) you will find most of the thought-experiments very familiar from EP.
    Epsilon Fork wrote:
    If anyone is aware of any published papers on the subject that can bring this discussion down to hypothesis, I would be be most grateful.
    I think there has been some nice progress on the sense of self. Plenty of studies and evidence showing that the parietal convergence zone is important for maintaining a sense of being a body in the world, and that disruptions of it can produce experiences of Zen-like absence (or dissociative disorders) and it is possible to produce full-body illusions where the centre of consciousness is experienced as being somewhere else. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC404216/pdf/1016827.pdf In addition, there is some evidence that the 'resting state network' of certain brain modules is related to self-awareness. See for instance http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12377180 http://www.imhr.ca/research/northofflab/documents/resting_cms_schneider_... http://www.ccbi.cmu.edu/reprints/Cherkassky_NeuroReport2006-reprint.pdf But this is of course the sense of being an 'I'. It doesn't mean there *is* something our idea of self actually refers accurately to. As for consciousness, I honestly have no clue. I am surrounded by philosophers of mind and neuroscientists with the most different views, so I can't make out the forest for all the trees. [ As for myself, being a hardcore functionalist I would be happy to upload. Sure, getting a nice Menton body would be good, but even better is the ability to take backups, fork and merge. As I see it, I am the equivalence class of all sufficiently Arenamontanus-like processes. ]
    —
    Extropian
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    Mon, 2010-06-28 20:20
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    TBRMInsanity wrote:
    There is defintly more work to be done to fully understand the biological processes that make use think. I do believe that the ability to map a mind into a computer (simulating current neural pathways) won't occur till shortly before, or after the technological singularity.
    Again, you don't need to understand those processes. In order to emulate how something works, you simply have to emulate the functions themselves, and do not have to understand what those functions do or why they do it. As I mentioned before, this is exactly how protein folding simulations work, and why they help us. We already know how a good majority of the individual biological process function, and that's all that is really necessary to start putting together a brain emulator. The biggest hurdle now is creating a computer that could run such a simulation at a respectable speed.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Wed, 2010-06-30 14:50
    The Doctor The Doctor's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Hakkonen wrote:
    If the technology for resleeving, and the variety of morphs, depicted in Eclipse Phase existed today, would you take the plunge?
    In a heartbeat. Cortical stack, mesh inserts, sex change augmentation, programmable chameleon skin... no more bad back, bad shoulder, bad teeth... as much as a neo-cephalopod appeals, I think I would have to go with a Menton for a new body.
    —
    [img]http://drwho.virtadpt.net/graphics/info_userbar.jpg[/img] [img]http://drwho.virtadpt.net/graphics/argo_userbar.jpg[/img] [url=https://drwho.virtadpt.net/graphics/blankbadge.png][img]http://drwho.vir...
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    Wed, 2010-06-30 14:55
    The Doctor The Doctor's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Decivre wrote:
    Again, you don't need to understand those processes. In order to emulate how something works, you simply have to emulate the functions themselves, and do not have to understand what those functions do or why they do it.
    Black box reverse engineering. Send a pattern to the box, record what it does. Rinse, repeat. That was the process by which AMD reverse engineered the i386 CPU many years ago, and look how far it got them...
    —
    [img]http://drwho.virtadpt.net/graphics/info_userbar.jpg[/img] [img]http://drwho.virtadpt.net/graphics/argo_userbar.jpg[/img] [url=https://drwho.virtadpt.net/graphics/blankbadge.png][img]http://drwho.vir...
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 04:13
    Ravennus Ravennus's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Not a chance. Unless, however, I wanted to kill myself. The technology as presented in EP simply allows a COPY of your mind to be transferred to another medium which will hold it... whether that is online (via Infomorph), another brain (Biomorph) or even a modern electronic recreation of the human brain (Synthmorph). Everyone that copies themselves then deletes the original version dies. It's very simple. Any arguments to the contrary are just philosophical noise. I don't believe in a soul or any such nonsense. My brain is purely biological... and given enough time and the right technology, I have no doubt that we'll one day be able to replicate and copy the functions of the human brain. But a copy is a copy is a copy. In a universe where I can 'fork' a version of myself, and make back-ups in case of accidental dismemberment... there is little doubt that the "me" who is looking out of these squishy eyeballs now will NOT be the same "me" that would be looking out the eyeballs of a different body. I have no doubt that this other version is still a sentient being with rights. But it is NOT the same person. As long as there is no physical transfer from my brain to whatever other body I might be occupying.... as long as it's just a copy.... the new 'me' is just a copy that has been programmed to believe the whole process went smoothly and that it was immortal. That is... until it decides to re-sleeve again, at which point it will learn the ultimate truth, but far too late. In fact, it won't learn anything because it will cease to be. And the cycle will continue forever or until there are no more backups. To me, the idea of re-sleeving has the potential to grant immortality. But I view it much more like humanity as always viewed having children. You are creating a legacy that will live on after you are dead. Re-Sleeving is just a much more reliable and precise method of passing on your legacy. But congrats; you're still dead. As a Sci-Fi trope and setting for a GAME, I love it. But in reality, the possibility scares the ever-loving crap out of me. The main reason is this: No matter how long they test the technology or how precise it is of copying your 'ego' , we will NEVER hear from those that came before us. We might hear from their duplicates, but never the originals. They are gone. Dead. And it's too late for them to warn us of our inevitable demise should we follow the same path. Of course, I could be wrong. But do you want to take that chance? I know I don't.
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 04:53
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Ravennus wrote:
    Not a chance. Unless, however, I wanted to kill myself. The technology as presented in EP simply allows a COPY of your mind to be transferred to another medium which will hold it... whether that is online (via Infomorph), another brain (Biomorph) or even a modern electronic recreation of the human brain (Synthmorph). Everyone that copies themselves then deletes the original version dies. It's very simple. Any arguments to the contrary are just philosophical noise. I don't believe in a soul or any such nonsense. My brain is purely biological... and given enough time and the right technology, I have no doubt that we'll one day be able to replicate and copy the functions of the human brain. But a copy is a copy is a copy.
    The word "copy" in the context of minds (much like with software) simply means "one of many exact duplicates". There is no inferiority when referencing any given copy of your mind, because mind uploads in Eclipse Phase are perfect 1:1 copies (unless you are talking about pruned beta or delta forks, or error copies). So riddle me this: If I give you a copy of the Eclipse Phase PDF, in what way is the copy I gave you inferior to the copy I have? Whether the original "dies" is debatable at best. The body does not die when the mind is uploaded. It is put into a vegetative mindless state while the ego is placed in a digital containment system. Since nothing actually died with the upload, then there's no particular reason to state that the person died to begin with.
    Ravennus wrote:
    In a universe where I can 'fork' a version of myself, and make back-ups in case of accidental dismemberment... there is little doubt that the "me" who is looking out of these squishy eyeballs now will NOT be the same "me" that would be looking out the eyeballs of a different body. I have no doubt that this other version is still a sentient being with rights. But it is NOT the same person.
    This can be agreed and disagreed to in many contexts. Sure, the body is different, but the mind is not. It really is a debate concerning software and hardware, much like with computers. If I install a game on one computer, then install the same game on another computer... is it the same game? Is it a different game altogether? If I put my Assassin's Creed disc in your XBox360, is it a different Assassin's Creed from when I put it in mine? The same is true with your mind. Whether it's in your original body, or on some brain emulator, or in a sleek new remade morph... it's the exact same mind that was running inside your original body.
    Ravennus wrote:
    As long as there is no physical transfer from my brain to whatever other body I might be occupying.... as long as it's just a copy.... the new 'me' is just a copy that has been programmed to believe the whole process went smoothly and that it was immortal. That is... until it decides to re-sleeve again, at which point it will learn the ultimate truth, but far too late. In fact, it won't learn anything because it will cease to be. And the cycle will continue forever or until there are no more backups.
    Everytime you turn off your computer, does it die? Everytime you shut off a program, does it cease to exist?
    Ravennus wrote:
    To me, the idea of re-sleeving has the potential to grant immortality. But I view it much more like humanity as always viewed having children. You are creating a legacy that will live on after you are dead. Re-Sleeving is just a much more reliable and precise method of passing on your legacy. But congrats; you're still dead.
    We are still redefining the word "dead" in this context. Physical death does not occur because the body does not die when you resleeve. In fact, someone else can resleeve into it, and it will continue to function. Informational death does not occur because your mind is preserved within a new piece of hardware. So the real question becomes: in what way have you died?
    Ravennus wrote:
    As a Sci-Fi trope and setting for a GAME, I love it. But in reality, the possibility scares the ever-loving crap out of me. The main reason is this: No matter how long they test the technology or how precise it is of copying your 'ego' , we will NEVER hear from those that came before us. We might hear from their duplicates, but never the originals. They are gone. Dead. And it's too late for them to warn us of our inevitable demise should we follow the same path. Of course, I could be wrong. But do you want to take that chance? I know I don't.
    I'd happily take the chance. Granted, I wouldn't resleeve until the technology has gotten to a certain point, though I would happily volunteer for non-destructive uploading for the purpose of experimentation until we do perfect the technology. I would be absolutely interested in meeting a digitally emulated version of myself, should the opportunity arise.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 06:36
    King Shere King Shere's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Ravennus wrote:
    Not a chance. Unless, however, I wanted to kill myself. The technology as presented in EP simply allows a COPY of your mind to be transferred to another medium which will hold it... whether that is online (via Infomorph), another brain (Biomorph) or even a modern electronic recreation of the human brain (Synthmorph). Everyone that copies themselves then deletes the original version dies. It's very simple. Any arguments to the contrary are just philosophical noise. I don't believe in a soul or any such nonsense. My brain is purely biological... and given enough time and the right technology, I have no doubt that we'll one day be able to replicate and copy the functions of the human brain. But a copy is a copy is a copy.
    I had the impression that both scenarios exist in EP, one where the "original" is moved and its consciousness not interrupted during that process & another (more popular) that "faxes" a copy. Its actually done in the same types of machines. Now the dilemma for sceptics would be how to differentiate re-sleeving method & their successful re-sleeving. Anyway the original question premise could be interpreted as already answering that dilema.. "If you could resleeve, would you?" (If you could re-sleeve, would you done it?) If You can resleeve, You are still You. If You wouldn't be there, You couldn't. In violation with the questions premise. "If you could resleeve" Naturally, that premise may be interpreted as not existing, and the question was "if re-sleeving was possible, (destroying the original & making a "fax" copy), would you be a willing victim?" [i]"Exactly what's on the tin?"[/i]
    —
    [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/tc_userbar.jpg[/img] [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/exh_userbar.jpg[/img] [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/argo_userbar.jpg[/img] [i]"To find fault is easy; to do better may be difficult."[/i] Plutarch
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 06:30
    Ravennus Ravennus's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Decivre wrote:
    Everytime you turn off your computer, does it die? Everytime you shut off a program, does it cease to exist?
    This question and the majority of your post are irrelevant to my post. I'm not talking about .pdf files, game disks or computers. I'm talking about self-aware consciousness. Everything you stated about copying is true, and if you read my previous post properly then you will see that I said as much. I have no doubt that we could one day reach a point where we can copy the human brain. But that doesn't mean we can transfer the consciousness in the process. Not when we are simply making duplicates of existing information; in this case, a brain and it's neural pathways. Copy it all you want and put it in whatever 'sleeve' you want, but in the end it is a duplicate. It can be perfectly exact, but it's still a duplicate. You are essentially creating a new self-aware consciousness and loosing it upon the universe, for better or for worse. The only possible argument that could be made for actually transferring the individual and unique consciousness would be if you actually were able to isolate the biological and physical seat of the aforementioned consciousness and safely transport it to a different vessel. Let me put it another way. Making a copy of a human brain, no matter how exact, is still just a copy. This works perfectly fine for objects, information or even non-sentient creatures (who honestly aren't smart enough to give a shit). But when we are dealing with self-aware sentient beings (yes, even AGI's)... a copy will simply be a new consciousness. It will be like a new-born baby, but hardwired with all the originals experiences in life. The consciousness that resided in the original body is completely separate. An example of this in EP would be what happens when you have active back-ups or 'Alpha' forks. They can run around in their own bodies, bio or synth, and have their own experiences. The consciousness of the original person does not simultaneously reside in all those bodies. They can not experience what those other consciousnesses are experiencing any more than you or I could see through the eyes of another average joe on the street. They are separate entities just as you and I are, even if they share the exact same memories. Now in EP, you can merge these forks.... effectively over-writing the consciousness of one mind with the combined experiences of all the others..... but that's another topic for another day. Either way, when that first meat brain goes in cold storage forever or is destroyed.... that's it for the original consciousness. The tricky thing with all of this is proving it.... and it's the same issue that religion has yet to crack since, well, forever. Since no one has ever truly died and come back to tell about it, we have no real way of knowing if there are pearly gates on the other side, or just nothing. Hell, if you think about it... for all we know, we are already in a 'transhuman' state. We might all be immortal and our consciousness returns in a new human body (or even as a cow.... Moooooo! TransBovinae??). Thing is, we have no real way of knowing. Even still, that is a far more legitimate question than wondering if a copy of Me walking around on another planet is still me... especially if that other 'me' was just some bits and bytes downloaded into a meat brain based on (what amounts to) a blueprint. Personally, I wouldn't take the chance of cutting this consciousness short. I wouldn't necessarily have a problem with getting a Cortical Stack implanted just so I could continue my legacy. But unless I was fully willing to move on from this life (as experienced through THIS consciousness) then I wouldn't take the chance.
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 06:36
    Ravennus Ravennus's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    King Shere wrote:
    Ravennus wrote:
    Not a chance. Unless, however, I wanted to kill myself. The technology as presented in EP simply allows a COPY of your mind to be transferred to another medium which will hold it... whether that is online (via Infomorph), another brain (Biomorph) or even a modern electronic recreation of the human brain (Synthmorph). Everyone that copies themselves then deletes the original version dies. It's very simple. Any arguments to the contrary are just philosophical noise. I don't believe in a soul or any such nonsense. My brain is purely biological... and given enough time and the right technology, I have no doubt that we'll one day be able to replicate and copy the functions of the human brain. But a copy is a copy is a copy.
    I had the impression that both scenarios exist in EP, one where the "original" is moved and its consciousness not interrupted during that process & another (more popular) that "faxes" a copy. Its actually done in the same types of machines. Now the dilemma for sceptics would be how to differentiate re-sleeving method & their successful re-sleeving. Anyway the original question premise could be interpreted as already answering that dilema.. "If you could re-sleeve, would you?" If you can resleeve, you are still you. Thus if you could -you can. If you wouldn't be there, you couldn't. In violation with the questions premise. "you could re-sleeve" Naturally, that premise may be interpreted as not existing, and the question was "if re-sleeving was possible, (destroying the original & making a "fax" copy), would you be a willing victim?" [i]"Exactly what's on the tin?"[/i]
    Still no, for all the same reasons listed. Nothing I have read so far about the process of re-sleeving in EP would make me want to experience it first-hand. However, if we are talking about a hypothetical re-sleeving that is of a different version as offered by EP... one that didn't involve copies, but actual transference of bio-matter from my brain to a different sleeve (and theoretically my consciousness)... then yes. But I assume the original question referred to re-sleeving as detailed in EP, which was what I was replying to. Still, I love EP and think it makes a great FICTIONAL game. :)
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 06:47
    King Shere King Shere's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Ravennus wrote:
    However, if we are talking about a hypothetical re-sleeving that is of a different version as offered by EP... one that didn't involve copies, but actual transference of bio-matter from my brain to a different sleeve (and theoretically my consciousness)... then yes. But I assume the original question referred to re-sleeving as detailed in EP, which was what I was replying to.
    Yes of course, but the hypothetical version is intriguing too, and EP scientists might have found that original consciousness & able to transfer it. And there are arguments to not re-sleeve even if it was "safe" & not a fax. Aside from rational fear of the healthy "dentist" appointment.
    —
    [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/tc_userbar.jpg[/img] [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/exh_userbar.jpg[/img] [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/argo_userbar.jpg[/img] [i]"To find fault is easy; to do better may be difficult."[/i] Plutarch
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 08:24
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Ravennus wrote:
    This question and the majority of your post are irrelevant to my post. I'm not talking about .pdf files, game disks or computers. I'm talking about self-aware consciousness. Everything you stated about copying is true, and if you read my previous post properly then you will see that I said as much. I have no doubt that we could one day reach a point where we can copy the human brain. But that doesn't mean we can transfer the consciousness in the process. Not when we are simply making duplicates of existing information; in this case, a brain and it's neural pathways.
    Actually, they are completely relevant. If you talk about the state of consciousness when defining the transfer of a mind, then you run into a few issues here. If "death" is defined as loss of consciousness, then death occurs everyday for virtually every human being. Personally, if all it takes is one more "death" during a mental upload to forever stay conscious and never suffer death again, then it sounds like a pretty good option. If, however, we are talking about consciousness as a higher sense of self, then it sounds to me like you're talking about a soul... and that's more of a spiritual affair.
    Ravennus wrote:
    Copy it all you want and put it in whatever 'sleeve' you want, but in the end it is a duplicate. It can be perfectly exact, but it's still a duplicate.
    Your use of the word "duplicate" seems malicious. What is so bad about being a "duplicate"? In what way is your "duplicate" inferior to you? In what way is it different? Let's give an appropriate scenario befitting the possibility: let's say someone hits you with a tranq dart one day. In the time you are unconscious, they successfully clone your body, age it up to match your age, and fix it so it is indistinguishable from your current body in every way. Next, they fork your mind and place a perfect 1:1 copy of your mind within this new body. They then simultaneously wake you both up, and never inform either of you who is the original... destroying all information and evidence that might let you know the truth, and potentially even going through steps to make sure even they don't know. Now... which one of you is the duplicate? How can you tell? In what way is he inferior to or different from the other?
    Ravennus wrote:
    You are essentially creating a new self-aware consciousness and loosing it upon the universe, for better or for worse.
    No, you're loosing another "you" on the world. There is a significant difference. Going back to my previous examples, I'm not creating new software when I make a copy... I'm making a copy of already-existing software.
    Ravennus wrote:
    The only possible argument that could be made for actually transferring the individual and unique consciousness would be if you actually were able to isolate the biological and physical seat of the aforementioned consciousness and safely transport it to a different vessel.
    For someone who mocks philosophical noise, you seem to be spouting philosophical noise. The "seat of consciousness" is a solely philosophical concept that hasn't yet been quantified in any real means. For all intents and purposes, it is almost indistinguishable from the spiritual concept of the soul. If, however, we are talking about some actual part of the mind when we talk about the "seat of consciousness", then we're talking about a biological process that can be recorded, uploaded and emulated. Therefore, it is completely possible to transfer, emulate and digitize.
    Ravennus wrote:
    Let me put it another way. Making a copy of a human brain, no matter how exact, is still just a copy. This works perfectly fine for objects, information or even non-sentient creatures (who honestly aren't smart enough to give a shit). But when we are dealing with self-aware sentient beings (yes, even AGI's)... a copy will simply be a new consciousness. It will be like a new-born baby, but hardwired with all the originals experiences in life. The consciousness that resided in the original body is completely separate.
    Now we are definitely drifting into the spiritual. Self-awareness is not some magical concept, but another biological process. It's not something unique to humans either. Self-awareness is becoming less and less something that separates us from the beasts, and more like something that is a natural part of the animal kingdom. Most mammals, many birds, and some cephalopods exhibit self-awareness, abstract thought, and even evidence of vivid dreams (though mostly in mammals with this one). Until someone comes up with a more concrete definition of sentience or sapience, I think it more safe to say that it's just another part of the brain that can be copied, like everything else.
    Ravennus wrote:
    An example of this in EP would be what happens when you have active back-ups or 'Alpha' forks. They can run around in their own bodies, bio or synth, and have their own experiences. The consciousness of the original person does not simultaneously reside in all those bodies. They can not experience what those other consciousnesses are experiencing any more than you or I could see through the eyes of another average joe on the street. They are separate entities just as you and I are, even if they share the exact same memories.
    Very true. In that same vein, what happens when I play my copy of Assassin's Creed does not necessarily happen on anyone else's copy of Assassin's Creed. Other copies of Assassin's Creed are not informed of what I do on my copy (unless the game does something like that through internet connection, though that could also happen with forks). Each copy of Assassin's Creed is a different instance of the game, even if they share the same exact code running. Now... are they all different games?
    Ravennus wrote:
    Now in EP, you can merge these forks.... effectively over-writing the consciousness of one mind with the combined experiences of all the others..... but that's another topic for another day. Either way, when that first meat brain goes in cold storage forever or is destroyed.... that's it for the original consciousness.
    Merging is more akin to combining the code of multiple minds into one. It doesn't override any one mind so much as it combines many minds into one new mind.
    Ravennus wrote:
    The tricky thing with all of this is proving it.... and it's the same issue that religion has yet to crack since, well, forever. Since no one has ever truly died and come back to tell about it, we have no real way of knowing if there are pearly gates on the other side, or just nothing. Hell, if you think about it... for all we know, we are already in a 'transhuman' state. We might all be immortal and our consciousness returns in a new human body (or even as a cow.... Moooooo! TransBovinae??). Thing is, we have no real way of knowing. Even still, that is a far more legitimate question than wondering if a copy of Me walking around on another planet is still me... especially if that other 'me' was just some bits and bytes downloaded into a meat brain based on (what amounts to) a blueprint.
    Why? What is wrong with considering other "copies" of yourself as still being you? What special attribute differentiates any of you? Going back to my previous example of you and a copy figuring out which is which, how can you tell which one has the original "consciousness"? More importantly, why does it matter?
    Ravennus wrote:
    Personally, I wouldn't take the chance of cutting this consciousness short. I wouldn't necessarily have a problem with getting a Cortical Stack implanted just so I could continue my legacy. But unless I was fully willing to move on from this life (as experienced through THIS consciousness) then I wouldn't take the chance.
    Humans have a nasty predilection for assigning magical or mystical qualities to things that astound and amaze us. Much as how we believed that lightning was the anger of the gods, or that the earth itself were formed by them, we like to believe that there is something special in us... because life itself is amazing. Eventually, however, we have found that these things weren't as "amazing" as we wanted them to be... lightning was just the rapid passing of electrons between the ionized clouds and earth, and the world was formed from an accretion disk of crap orbiting our sun a few billion years ago. In that same vein, we have found many of those amazing aspects of us to be more explainable and simple than we might have wanted. Love stopped being some magical force that binds us, and started to be an interesting combination of sexual instincts and emotional compatibility. Morality stopped being some force of the world, and started to be a complex social construct that has evolved along with civilization. Consciousness and the concept of the soul sits in a pile of remaining unknowns, right there with death, for things that we have yet to explore and explain. However, just because we can't explain it doesn't make it magical, or special. If anything, common sense and precedent dictate that it is just as "mundane" as everything else we've studied up close. But really, what is so bad about being explainable, "mundane" and copyable? Why would it be a bad thing if you found out that consciousness was nothing magical, and that a perfect 1:1 copy of your mind was effectively the same as the one already in your head? Would it really be all that bad if you found out that deep within that wonderful symphony of molecular transitions and chemical processes that make up your body and mind, you were really just complex software housed in meat hardware? Me? I don't sweat it at all. I don't worry about this or that consciousness anymore than I wonder if I die and are reborn everytime I go to sleep. So long as we continue to be, I don't see why we should worry about these things.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 10:28
    King Shere King Shere's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Decivre wrote:
    Actually, they are completely relevant. If you talk about the state of consciousness when defining the transfer of a mind, then you run into a few issues here. If "death" is defined as loss of consciousness, then death occurs everyday for virtually every human being. Personally, if all it takes is one more "death" during a mental upload to forever stay conscious and never suffer death again, then it sounds like a pretty good option.
    I would argue , that brain activity = living consciousness. And if there is no brain activity a person will likely be declared brain dead. It doesn't happen often, that all brain activity ceases. Sleepers, drunkads & sneezer s don't loose all brain activity, as I understood it. But yes there are cases of strong sedations that causes reboots -such rebooted person is probably a "new" consciousness -though they may also be the same - Is it a new person that resides , or is it a "impared" old one? Its hard for outsiders to tell them apart (or mistakes one for the other). Dementia is a source of grief, as the demented often are compared with his former self. But AFAIK we still don't "fully" know how the brain works, lots of obvious & standard questions never explored. And there are scholar & faculty feuds hindering things. Misquoting Eric Drexler ( regarding what's healthy diet) But I think the problem/symptom exist in more areas than diet research. 1. Standard research methods can answer many questions. 2. No one does the standard work that would answer questions. 3. The system hasn’t changed, and has no signs of real effort to change it.
    —
    [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/tc_userbar.jpg[/img] [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/exh_userbar.jpg[/img] [img]http://boxall.no-ip.org/img/argo_userbar.jpg[/img] [i]"To find fault is easy; to do better may be difficult."[/i] Plutarch
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 10:43
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    King Shere wrote:
    I would argue , that brain activity = living consciousness. And if there is no brain activity a person will likely be declared brain dead. It doesn't happen often, that all brain activity ceases. Sleepers, drunkads & sneezer s don't loose all brain activity, as I understood it.
    Even then, it's an arguable concept. For instance, today's classifications basically draw the line at brain death versus persistent vegetative state: the former being the actual death of the brain to the point that it is even incapable of sustaining autonomic functions, and the latter being a state of wakefulness without detectable awareness. In the case of PVS, brain activity continues, but there is not necessarily any sign of consciousness remaining (though there often is). Is someone in a persistent vegetative state a living consciousness? If so, then an "unsleeved" body is still a living consciousness as well. Brain activity must continue, lest the brain die and the body cease to be usable. It is in effect a tabula rasa in a permanent coma... but there is no death involved.
    King Shere wrote:
    But yes there are cases of strong sedations that causes reboots -such rebooted person is probably a "new" consciousness -though they may also be the same - Is it a new person that resides , or is it a "impared" old one? Its hard for outsiders to tell them apart (or mistakes one for the other). Dementia is a source of grief, as the demented often are compared with his former self.
    But then we start hitting some very controversial topics. Is a person with amnesia a new consciousness? How much of your memories must remain for you to continue being you? What if I used kinase M zeta in massive quantities to erase every single memory in your mind, without letting you go unconscious... are you still you?
    King Shere wrote:
    But AFAIK we still don't "fully" know how the brain works, lots of obvious & standard questions never explored. And there are scholar & faculty feuds hindering things. Misquoting Eric Drexler ( regarding what's healthy diet) But I think the problem/symptom exist in more areas than diet research. 1. Standard research methods can answer many questions. 2. No one does the standard work that would answer questions. 3. The system hasn’t changed, and has no signs of real effort to change it.
    How very true this is.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 11:19
    nezumi.hebereke nezumi.hebereke's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Ravennus - two questions. 1) What do you consider 'sleeping'? For me, it is shutting down of my consciousness, my ego, for a prolonged period of time. Upon waking, I have lost memories I had prior to sleeping. It's also reset my emotional, psychological, and even physical state. Is the conscious ego on 7/4 8:30am the same one that went to bed on 7/3 10:30pm? What is the common thread that binds them? 2) What is 'the line' (since I'm under the impression you believe there is one)? If I installed something in your brain that let you suddenly understand string theory, when before you couldn't, I have modified your consciousness. Are you the same person you were prior? What if I modified your brain chemistry to make you transgendered (i.e., you honestly believe you are the opposite sex of your body), gave you extra-sensory powers, introduced fabricated memories, etc? Would any of these make you a 'new' person? What if I did the reverse and eliminated knowledge, made you blind, destroyed memories, etc. Would any of these make you a 'new' person?
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 11:28
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    nezumi.hebereke wrote:
    2) What is 'the line' (since I'm under the impression you believe there is one)? If I installed something in your brain that let you suddenly understand string theory, when before you couldn't, I have modified your consciousness. Are you the same person you were prior? What if I modified your brain chemistry to make you transgendered (i.e., you honestly believe you are the opposite sex of your body), gave you extra-sensory powers, introduced fabricated memories, etc? Would any of these make you a 'new' person? What if I did the reverse and eliminated knowledge, made you blind, destroyed memories, etc. Would any of these make you a 'new' person?
    Hell, we can even take a step back from that: if you take psychiatric drugs, do they make you a different person altogether? To what degree can you alter the mind before it is no longer your mind? What about something I brought up prior in this very thread; if the human body replaces every single cell within it approximately once a decade throughout an average lifespan, are you still the same person in 10 years, or has that person died and been replaced by someone new?
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 17:04
    Ravennus Ravennus's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    This will be my last post on the topic, as I'm not here to argue philosophy, as Decivre seems VERY keen to do. This is my personal opinion, but this topic has absolutely nothing to do with philosophy. To me, the definition of death, the soul, and consciousness doesn't matter. Very simply... if by the same process of putting my mind into another body you can also make duplicate versions of my mind.... all of which can walk around on their own without any say from me, or even any shared sensory input.... then those are not me. Not the same me that is looking out from these eyes. This version of 'me' will cease to exist the moment it's brain ceases to function. It's that simple. Nothing anyone will say to me will make me believe any differently. But thankfully this isn't a reality yet, and it's just a GAME. One of which I'm happy to play. And honestly, these kind of dilemmas make for great RPing!
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    Sun, 2010-07-04 18:00
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Ravennus wrote:
    This will be my last post on the topic, as I'm not here to argue philosophy, as Decivre seems VERY keen to do. This is my personal opinion, but this topic has absolutely nothing to do with philosophy. To me, the definition of death, the soul, and consciousness doesn't matter. Very simply... if by the same process of putting my mind into another body you can also make duplicate versions of my mind.... all of which can walk around on their own without any say from me, or even any shared sensory input.... then those are not me. Not the same me that is looking out from these eyes. This version of 'me' will cease to exist the moment it's brain ceases to function. It's that simple. Nothing anyone will say to me will make me believe any differently. But thankfully this isn't a reality yet, and it's just a GAME. One of which I'm happy to play. And honestly, these kind of dilemmas make for great RPing!
    Whether your intention was to argue philosophy or not, you cannot deny that philosophy is integral to what you were and are saying. Consciousness, death, and even sense of self (your statement here) are all philosophical topics. To that end, I wasn't trying to argue with you, just spark some discussing points for the thread. I do think it odd, however, that you would try to discuss the sense of self while simultaneously avoiding the topic of philosophy. It seems akin to discussing fractions while avoiding the topic of math.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Mon, 2010-07-05 08:02
    nezumi.hebereke nezumi.hebereke's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    I would tend to agree with Decivre there! The point is that the technology of resleeving has HUGE implications for the soul, for what we consider death, etc. The character in one of my games right now is facing an ethical crisis. She has an uploaded copy of a member of her family, now dead for about twenty years. She is stuck asking herself, if I run the copy, am I 'reviving' this person? Do I have a moral obligation as a doctor to run this upload and save this person, bringing her (them? Still working on the 'they' thing here...) back from the dead? Or is this instead an act of reproduction? The original person, my family member, has been dead twenty years, and will continue to be dead. If I run the upload, I'm not 'saving' anyone - I'm creating a new person. And in a world where population is outstripping resources, creating a new person would seem to in fact be unethical. I don't have an answer for that. However, the questions I asked previously I asked for a specific reason - because resleeving can be different from reinstantiating a shut off upload, or just making a photocopy. Resleeving can be a question of degrees. IMO, if I add or take away a small piece of knowledge or memories or mental capability or personality aspect, I may be different, but I'm still me. The fact that I do this every day is just part of life - I am constantly adding or taking away parts of what I consider my identity. Done properly, resleeving can be like this - twenty years change, ten years of cellular regeneration compressed into an hour (and put on a different line). As long as it moves at a speed slow enough for my brain to constantly reintegrate, I'm still 'me'. So let's say I start with my memories. Every minute, one year of my memories is uploaded to an external device, still connected to me, and the part of my brain is wiped. My consciousness is still entirely intact, and really, just about identical. I remember everything, carry the same views. Every minute something changes imperceptibly, but it's so small that I 'heal' that mental damage almost immediately. I'm still a cohesive whole. We move on to say the frontal lobes, and synapse by synapse, the data is carefully copied, checked and wiped. At no point am "I" a copy. I'm simply incorporating new 'cellular growth' into my body, and eliminating the redundant stuff, while constantly keeping the neural connections that define me. Unless you do consider the cellular regeneration of normal life to be death, then the above method shouldn't be considered death either. (I, as I mentioned, do consider that cellular regeneration death, but that's a different argument.) That said, YES, I agree, if you are making a copy and not deleting each tiny item from the original brain following, then the end result is two copies - two individual people. Killing the original at that point is in fact murdering someone. I think that's what you were describing, and I do agree.
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    Mon, 2010-07-05 13:54
    Arenamontanus Arenamontanus's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    nezumi.hebereke wrote:
    I would tend to agree with Decivre there! The point is that the technology of resleeving has HUGE implications for the soul, for what we consider death, etc. The character in one of my games right now is facing an ethical crisis. She has an uploaded copy of a member of her family, now dead for about twenty years. She is stuck asking herself, if I run the copy, am I 'reviving' this person? Do I have a moral obligation as a doctor to run this upload and save this person, bringing her (them? Still working on the 'they' thing here...) back from the dead?
    I think this brings our some of the more intriguing role-playing possibilities of EP. Before the Fall, these questions were there and were debated, but to most people they were not too urgent - resleeving was not that common, many people had no stacks and so on. Then came the Fall. If you didn't upload, your chances were extremely slim. The population of the solar system is largely the people (or copies of people :-) ) who had the resources, willingness or sheer desperation to do it. Many didn't want to, but were frightened by the advance of the TITAN horrors, badgered into it by relatives ("No gramps, you *are* coming with us to the scanning facility. See this duct tape?") or even forced by governments and hypercorps. Many did not have the time to consider, and now find themselves and their families utterly changed. Existential angst is just the start of it. The current solar system has to a large degree been set up by the groups most gung ho about these technologies. But there are many of the unwillingly dragged along who harbour doubts about their identities or even souls.
    —
    Extropian
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    Mon, 2010-07-05 16:11
    nezumi.hebereke nezumi.hebereke's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Definitely. I feel like the book had so much to focus on, it really didn't underscore the huge, psychological trauma that is going to be basically universal throughout the population. In one group I'm playing with, one character saw his wife and child die on Earth while he was posted to security duties elsewhere. Another character was a son (or daughter) of the fall, not even having reached puberty when it transpired, and is now living under the rule of a bunch of scarred old people. The third was uploaded against her will, and is now struggling with the ethical questions of resleeving the uploads of her family. In a world where 99% of the population is refugees, refugees who not only had to leave their possessions, family and homeworld, never to return, but who oftentimes had to leave their *bodies*, and may be working hoping to make enough money to reinstantiate loved ones. The emotional turmoil of that is simply... overpowering.
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    Mon, 2010-07-05 18:59
    Arenamontanus Arenamontanus's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    nezumi.hebereke wrote:
    In a world where 99% of the population is refugees, refugees who not only had to leave their possessions, family and homeworld, never to return, but who oftentimes had to leave their *bodies*, and may be working hoping to make enough money to reinstantiate loved ones. The emotional turmoil of that is simply... overpowering.
    One of the sinister touches I use in my game is that nearly everybody is on medication, psychoterapy, or psychosurgery to deal with the trauma. Sure, things look pretty sane on the surface, but that is because most people are doped to the gills, have ongoing muse assistance not to break down in tears or have simply softened the memories of the horrors of the Fall so they don't bother them any more. "Well, I was part of the staff at the Vandenburg station, fast-scanning everybody we could. We just chucked their heads into the chopper and threw the bodies out the window. I choose to stay behind because I hoped my family would make it to the station, but they couldn't get across the defence line. In the end I had to put my head in too as the lieutenant decided to set off the nukes. Nah, it doesn't bother me. Why do you ask?" And of course, practically nobody talks about their little problems.
    —
    Extropian
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    Wed, 2010-07-07 06:10
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Arenamontanus wrote:
    I think this brings our some of the more intriguing role-playing possibilities of EP. Before the Fall, these questions were there and were debated, but to most people they were not too urgent - resleeving was not that common, many people had no stacks and so on. Then came the Fall. If you didn't upload, your chances were extremely slim. The population of the solar system is largely the people (or copies of people :-) ) who had the resources, willingness or sheer desperation to do it. Many didn't want to, but were frightened by the advance of the TITAN horrors, badgered into it by relatives ("No gramps, you *are* coming with us to the scanning facility. See this duct tape?") or even forced by governments and hypercorps. Many did not have the time to consider, and now find themselves and their families utterly changed. Existential angst is just the start of it. The current solar system has to a large degree been set up by the groups most gung ho about these technologies. But there are many of the unwillingly dragged along who harbour doubts about their identities or even souls.
    One of the ways we have treaded into this theme with one of my campaigns is with hypercorp and non-profit organizations who run facilities called "thaw boxes". Essentially, they run clandestine trips down to Earth to retrieve people who went through the process of cryopreservation, then upload their minds to be put into new bodies (my campaign assumes that we haven't found a way to actually thaw a body, and instead simply use destructive uploading to extract the mind). Before that can work out though, they are put through intense psychotherapy to help them cope with the idea that they are uploads, because the largest majority of people who went through cryopreservation did so because they believe in the concept of a soul, and refused to egocast. These thaw boxes are assembled mainly out of desperation, because the human race needs fresh minds to fill up the massive gap that was created with the loss of Earth. I've even wrestled with making a new background for them, with slightly more perks than the reinstantiated, but coupled with sanity problems (mainly depression).
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Thu, 2010-07-08 04:53
    Narshero Narshero's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Personally, my big problem with the whole "Resleeving: Is It Really Death?" debate is that there's no way to know for certain. Even if every single person who had undergone the process came out the other end happy and well-adjusted and absolutely sure that the procedure worked, there's no was to be 100% absolutely certain that when I went into the booth, the thing that came out the other end wasn't an entirely separate entity from me, who has both all of my memories and the absolute belief that the procedure did, in fact, work. A line from Buffy about the nature of vampirism (in that setting) just popped up in my brain: "That's not how this works. When they take you, YOU DIE, and a demon takes over your body." (I'm sure that's horribly paraphrased, but the meaning is more or less unedited.) Of course, as a scifi-horror roleplaying game, that scenario affords certain... ideas... That being said, my answer to the original question is probably "not unless it was necessary." Plenty to do with nanotech, biotech, and cybernetics before I have to go and get a whole new body.
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    Thu, 2010-07-08 06:16
    Decivre Decivre's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    Narshero wrote:
    Personally, my big problem with the whole "Resleeving: Is It Really Death?" debate is that there's no way to know for certain. Even if every single person who had undergone the process came out the other end happy and well-adjusted and absolutely sure that the procedure worked, there's no was to be 100% absolutely certain that when I went into the booth, the thing that came out the other end wasn't an entirely separate entity from me, who has both all of my memories and the absolute belief that the procedure did, in fact, work. A line from Buffy about the nature of vampirism (in that setting) just popped up in my brain: "That's not how this works. When they take you, YOU DIE, and a demon takes over your body." (I'm sure that's horribly paraphrased, but the meaning is more or less unedited.) Of course, as a scifi-horror roleplaying game, that scenario affords certain... ideas... That being said, my answer to the original question is probably "not unless it was necessary." Plenty to do with nanotech, biotech, and cybernetics before I have to go and get a whole new body.
    It's a philosophy concept that has existed for a very long time. Prior to this most recent form of it, some philosophers debated on the nature of sleep, and whether you were the same person while you woke up, or a new person created out of the memories of a previous person who died when they fell into unconsciousness. The problem is that we cannot know for sure, because we have all of the memories of that original person, which we believe to be our own. The same will likely be true with resleeving... we will forever have debates on how we define self, define existence, and how we define where the two overlap.
    —
    Transhumans will one day be the Luddites of the posthuman age. [url=http://bit.ly/2p3wk7c]Help me get my gaming fix, if you want.[/url]
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    Thu, 2010-07-08 09:24
    nezumi.hebereke nezumi.hebereke's picture
    Re: If you could resleeve, would you?
    This is why I always have a big party before I take a nap. I figure if I'm going to be the version of me to only exist for a few hours, during which I'm probably doing just work, I may as well go out with a bang (albeit, a little one).
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